

# RWANDA

## Physical and Social Geography

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The Rwandan Republic, like the neighbouring Republic of Burundi, is distinctive both for the small size of its territory and for the density of its population. Covering an area of 26,338 sq km (10,169 sq miles), Rwanda had an enumerated population of 7,142,755 at the census of 15 August 1991, with a density of 271 inhabitants per sq km. However, political and ethnic violence during 1994 was estimated to have resulted in the death or external displacement of 35%–40% of the total population. Prior to these events, the population had been composed of Hutu (about 85%), Tutsi (about 14%) and Twa (1%). According to the preliminary results of a national census, published in December 2002, Rwanda's population had recovered to about 8.2m., indicating an increase of 12% since the 1991 census. At mid-2008, according to UN estimates, the population totalled 10,009,000, with a density of 380.0 inhabitants per sq km. The official languages are French, English (which is widely spoken by the Tutsi minority) and Kinyarwanda, a Bantu language with close similarities to Kirundi, the main vernacular language of Burundi.

It seems, at first sight, strange that Rwanda has not been absorbed into a wider political entity. Admittedly, the Rwandan nation has long been united by language and custom and was part of a state that won the respect of the east African slave-traders. However, other ethnic groups, such as the Kongo, Luba, Luo and Zande, which were well established in small territorial areas, have not been able to develop into national states. That Rwanda has been able to achieve this is partly the result of developments during the colonial period. While part of German East Africa, Rwanda (then known, with Burundi, as Ruanda-Urundi) was regarded as a peripheral colonial territory of little economic interest. After the First World War it was entrusted to Belgium under a mandate from

the League of Nations. The territory was administered jointly with the Belgian Congo, but was not absorbed into the larger state. The historic separateness and national traditions of both Rwanda and Burundi have prevented their amalgamation, although both countries participate, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries.

Although the land supports a high population density, physical conditions are not very favourable. Rwanda's land mass is very rugged and fragmented. It is part of a Pre-Cambrian shelf from which, through erosion, the harder rocks have protruded, leaving the softer ones submerged. Thus very ancient folds have been raised and a relief surface carved out with steep gradients covered with a soil poor in quality because of its fineness and fragility. Rwanda's physiognomy therefore consists of a series of sharply defined hills, with steep slopes and flat ridges, which are intersected by deep valleys, the bottoms of which are often formed by marshy plains. The north is dominated by the lofty and powerful chain of volcanoes, the Virunga, whose highest peak is Karisimbi (4,519 m) and whose lava, having scarcely cooled down, has not yet produced cultivable soil.

The climate is tropical, although tempered by altitude, with a daily temperature range of as much as 14°C. Kigali, the capital (860,000 inhabitants at mid-2007, according to UN estimates), has an average temperature of 19°C and 1,000 mm of rain. Altitude is a factor that modifies the temperature (and prevents sleeping sickness above about 900 m), but such a factor is of debatable value for agriculture. Average annual rainfall (785 mm) is only barely sufficient for agricultural purposes, but two wet and two relatively dry seasons are experienced, making two harvests possible.

## Recent History

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### HUTU ASCENDANCY

Rwanda was not an artificial creation of colonial rule. When Rwanda and Burundi were absorbed by German East Africa in 1899, they had been established kingdoms for several centuries. In 1916, during the First World War, Belgian forces occupied the region. From 1920 Rwanda formed part of Ruanda-Urundi, administered by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate and later as a UN Trust Territory. In 1961 it was decided by referendum to replace Rwanda's monarchy with a republic, to which full independence was granted on 1 July 1962. Political life in the new Republic was dominated by its first President, Grégoire Kayibanda, and the governing party, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), also known as the Parti de l'émancipation du peuple Hutu (Parmehutu). Tensions between the majority Hutu (comprising about 85% of the population) and their former Belgian-imposed overlords, the Tutsi (14%), which had sporadically erupted into serious violence during 1963–65, recurred in late 1972 and early 1973. These tensions were the seeds of the 1994 genocide, perpetrated by Hutu, of between 800,000 and 1m. people, mostly Tutsi but also some perceived Hutu and Twa sympathizers.

In July 1973 the Minister of Defence and head of the National Guard, Maj.-Gen. Juvénal Habyarimana, deposed Kayibanda, proclaimed a Second Republic and established a military Government under his leadership. In 1975 a new ruling party, the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND), was formed. A referendum in December 1978 approved a new Constitution, aimed at returning the country to civil government in accordance with an undertaking by Habyarimana in 1973 to end the military regime within five years. An unsuccessful coup attempt took place in April 1980, and elections to the legislature, the Conseil national du développement (CND), were held in December 1981 and in December 1983; also in December 1983 Habyarimana was re-elected President.

From 1982 cross-border refugee problems began to affect Rwanda's relations with Uganda, and would later contribute to violence within Rwanda. In October Rwanda closed its border with Uganda after an influx of 45,000 refugees, most of whom were Rwandan exiles fleeing Ugandan persecution. A further 32,000 refugees gathered in camps on the Ugandan side of the border. In March 1983 Rwanda agreed to resettle more than 30,000 refugees, but Ugandan persecution of ethnic Rwandans continued, and in December thousands crossed into Tanzania. In November 1985 it was reported that 30,000 ethnic Rwandan

refugees had been repatriated to Uganda. In 1986 the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were about 110,000 registered Rwandan refugees living in Uganda, while an even greater number of refugees were believed to have settled in Uganda without registering with UNHCR. In July the central committee of the MRND issued a declaration that Rwanda would not allow the return of large numbers of refugees, since the country's economy was incapable of sustaining such an influx. In the same year, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda announced that Rwandans who had been resident in Uganda for more than 10 years would automatically be entitled to Ugandan citizenship. A resurgence of ethnic tensions in Burundi led to the flight, in August 1988, of an estimated 80,000 refugees, mainly Hutu, into Rwanda. With assistance from the international community, the Rwandan authorities were able to address their needs. By June 1989 all but approximately 1,000 of the refugees had been repatriated to Burundi.

During the December 1988 presidential election, Habyarimana, as sole candidate, reportedly secured 99.98% of the votes cast. Elections for the CND were held in the same month, and the Government was reorganized in January 1989. During 1989 economic conditions deteriorated sharply, and the introduction of an economic austerity programme in December increased public discontent. In early July 1990 Habyarimana conceded that political reform was necessary and announced that a national commission would be appointed to investigate the matter. The Commission nationale de synthèse (CNS) was duly established in September with a mandate to make recommendations for political renewal. However, these measures did little to alleviate the acute sense of political crisis.

#### REBEL INVASION AND POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

On 1 October 1990 an estimated force of 10,000 militia, representing the exiled, Tutsi-dominated Front patriotique rwandais (FPR), crossed the border from Uganda into north-eastern Rwanda, where they swiftly occupied several towns. The troops were primarily Tutsi refugees, but they also included significant numbers of disaffected elements of Uganda's ruling National Resistance Army (NRA, now the Uganda People's Defence Force—UPDF). The invasion force was led by Maj.-Gen. Fred Rwigyema, a former Ugandan Deputy Minister of Defence. In response to a request for assistance from Habyarimana, Belgian and French paratroopers were dispatched to the capital, Kigali, to protect foreign nationals and to secure evacuation routes. A contingent of troops sent by Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo—DRC) assisted the small Rwandan army in turning back the FPR some 70 km from Kigali.

The conflict continued throughout 1991 and into 1992, as the FPR made frequent guerrilla forays into Rwanda. Both sides of the conflict reported thousands of casualties, and many civilians resident in the border regions were killed and as many as 100,000 displaced. Increasing ethnic tensions, exacerbated by the war, resulted in a series of unprovoked attacks upon Tutsi civilians and prompted accusations of government involvement, particularly in the Bugesera region of southern Rwanda. In late July 1992 it was reported that the warring parties had negotiated a cease-fire, providing for the establishment of a 'neutral area'.

The CNS published its report and a draft constitution in March 1991. In June the new Constitution, providing for the legalization of political parties, entered into force. Full freedom of the press was declared, leading to the establishment of a number of magazines and newspapers critical of government policy. In April 1992, following a series of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a transitional government, the composition of a broad-based coalition Government, incorporating four opposition parties (the revived MDR, the Parti social-démocrate—PSD, the Parti libéral—PL and the Parti démocratique chrétien—PDC), together with the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MRNDD—the new party name adopted by the MRND in April 1991), was announced. The new administration was to be headed by Dismas Nsengiyaremye of the MDR as Prime Minister, a post established by the Constitution. Multi-party elections

for municipalities, the legislature and the presidency were to take place before April 1993. In late April 1992, in compliance with a new constitutional prohibition of the armed forces' participation in the political process, Habyarimana relinquished his military title and functions.

The coalition Government and FPR representatives initiated a new dialogue in May 1992 and conducted formal discussions in Paris, France during June. Further negotiations, in Arusha, Tanzania, in July resulted in an agreement on the implementation of a new cease-fire, to take effect from the end of that month, and the creation of a military observer group (GOM) sponsored by the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union—AU), to comprise representatives from both sides, together with officers drawn from the armed forces of Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe and Mali. However, subsequent negotiations in Tanzania failed to resolve outstanding problems.

A resurgence in violence followed the breakdown of negotiations in early February 1993, resulting in the deaths of hundreds on both sides. An estimated 1m. civilians fled southwards and to neighbouring Uganda and Tanzania in order to escape the fighting. Belgium, France and the USA denounced the actions of the FPR and French reinforcements were dispatched to join a small French military contingent, stationed in Kigali since October 1990, in order to protect French nationals. Meanwhile, the Commander of the GOM declared that the group possessed inadequate manpower and resources to contain the advance of the FPR towards the capital and requested the deployment of an additional 400 OAU troops. In late February 1993 the Government accepted FPR terms for a cease-fire in return for an end to attacks against FPR positions and on Tutsi communities, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Although fighting continued with varying intensity, new peace negotiations were convened in March in Arusha. Later that month France began to withdraw its troops.

Negotiations conducted during April 1993 failed to produce a solution to the crucial issue of the structure of future unitary Rwandan armed forces. In the same month the five participating parties in the ruling coalition agreed to a three-month extension of the Government's mandate in order to facilitate a peace accord. Further talks during May between the Government and the FPR in the northern town of Kinshira produced significant progress, including an agreed schedule for the demobilization of the 19,000-strong security forces. In June an agreed protocol outlined the repatriation of all Rwandan refugees resident in Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire, including recommendations that compensation be made to those forced into exile more than 12 years before. In late June the UN Security Council approved the creation of the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), to be deployed on the Ugandan side of the border for an initial period of six months, in order to block FPR military supply lines.

In July 1993, with improved prospects for a prompt resolution of the conflict, Habyarimana met representatives of the five political parties represented in the Government and sought a further extension to the mandate of the coalition Government. However, the Prime Minister's insistence that the FPR should be represented in any newly mandated government exacerbated existing divisions within the MDR, prompting Habyarimana to conclude the agreement with a conciliatory group of MDR dissidents, including the Minister of Education, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was elected as Rwanda's first female Prime Minister on 17 July. The Council of Ministers was reorganized to replace the disaffected MDR members.

On 4 August 1993 Habyarimana and Col Alex Kanyarengwe of the FPR formally signed a peace accord in Arusha. A new transitional Government, to be headed by a mutually approved Prime Minister (later named as the MDR moderate faction leader, Faustin Twagiramungu), was to be installed by 10 September. A multi-party general election was to take place after a 22-month period, during which the FPR would participate in a transitional government and national assembly. In mid-August the Government revoked the curfew in Kigali and removed military road-blocks from all but three northern prefectures. By the end of the month, however, the Prime Minister was forced to make a national appeal for calm,

following reports of renewed outbreaks of violence in Kigali and Butare. The Government and the FPR attributed the failure to establish a transitional government and legislature by 10 September to the increasingly fragile security situation, and both sides urged the prompt dispatch of a neutral UN force to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Accord. Meanwhile, relations between the Government and the FPR deteriorated, following the rebels' assertion that the Government had violated the Accord by attempting to dismantle and reorganize those departments assigned to the FPR under the terms of the agreement.

### UN INTERVENTION

On 5 October 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 872, endorsing the recommendation of the UN Secretary-General for the creation of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), under the leadership of Canadian Lt-Gen. Roméo Dallaire, to be deployed in Rwanda for an initial period of six months, with a mandate to monitor observance of the cease-fire, to contribute to the security of the capital and to facilitate the repatriation of refugees. UNAMIR, incorporating UNOMUR and GOM, was formally inaugurated on 1 November, and comprised some 2,500 personnel when fully operational. In mid-December the UN declared that it was satisfied that conditions had been sufficiently fulfilled to allow for the introduction of the transitional institutions by the end of the month.

In late December 1993 UNAMIR officials escorted a 600-strong FPR battalion to Kigali to ensure the safety of FPR representatives selected to participate in the transitional Government and legislature. On 5 January 1994, Habyarimana was invested as President of a transitional Government, for a 22-month period, under the terms of the Arusha Accord. (Habyarimana's previous term of office, in accordance with the Constitution, had expired on 19 December 1993.) While government spokesmen identified the need to resolve internal differences within the MDR and the PL as the crucial expedient for the implementation of the new Government and legislature, a joint statement, issued by the PSD, the PDC and factions of the MDR and the PL, accused the President of having abused the terms of the Arusha Accord by interfering in the selection of prospective ministers and deputies. The FPR repeated this charge in late February 1994, when it rejected a list of proposed gubernatorial and legislative representatives. During January and February Dallaire reported that the Habyarimana Government was increasing anti-Tutsi propaganda across Rwanda, stockpiling weapons and training youth militias. Dallaire insisted that anti-Tutsi sentiment was rapidly increasing and that violence against Tutsi was likely in the coming months. In March the Prime Minister-designate, Twagiramungu, declared that he had fulfilled his consultative role as established by the Arusha Accord, and announced the composition of a transitional Government, in an attempt to accelerate the installation of the transitional bodies. However, political opposition to the proposed Council of Ministers persisted, and Habyarimana insisted that the list of legislative deputies, newly presented by Uwilingiyimana, should be modified to include representatives of additional political parties, including the ethnically divisive Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR, whose participation was strongly opposed by the FPR, owing to its alleged failure to accept the code of ethics for the behaviour of political parties and its policies advocating ethnic discrimination), prompting a further postponement of the formation of a transitional administration.

In April 1994 the UN Security Council (which in February had warned that the UN presence in Rwanda might be withdrawn in the absence of swift progress in the implementation of the Arusha Accord) agreed to extend UNAMIR's mandate for four months, pending a review of progress made in implementing the accord, to be conducted after six weeks.

### COLLAPSE OF CIVIL ORDER AND GENOCIDE

On 6 April 1994 the presidential aircraft, returning from a regional summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, was fired upon over Kigali, and exploded on landing, killing all 10 passengers,

including Habyarimana, Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira, two Burundian cabinet ministers, and the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan armed forces. In Kigali, although it was unclear who had been responsible for the attack on the aircraft, the presidential guard obstructed UNAMIR officials attempting to investigate the crash site and immediately initiated a brutal campaign of retributive violence against political opponents of the late President. As politicians and civilians fled the capital, the brutality of the political assassinations was compounded by attacks on the clergy, UNAMIR personnel and Tutsi civilians. Hutu civilians were forced to murder their Tutsi neighbours. The mobilization of the *Interahamwe*, or unofficial militias (allegedly affiliated to the MRNDD and the CDR), apparently committed to the massacre of government opponents and Tutsi civilians, was encouraged by the presidential guard (with support from some factions of the armed forces) and by inflammatory broadcasts from Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines in Kigali. The President of the Constitutional Court, the Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs and of Information, and the Chairman of the PSD were among the prominent politicians assassinated, or declared missing and presumed dead, within hours of Habyarimana's death.

On 8 April 1994 the Speaker of the CND, Dr Théodore Sindikubwabo, announced that he had assumed the office of interim President of the Republic, in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Constitution. The five remaining participating political parties and factions of the Government selected a new Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, and a new Council of Ministers (largely comprising MRNDD members). The FPR immediately challenged the legality of the new administration, claiming that the CND's constitutional right of succession to the presidency had been superseded by Habyarimana's inauguration as President in January under the terms of the Arusha Accord. The legitimacy of the new Government, which had fled to the town of Gitarama to escape escalating violence in the capital, was subsequently rejected by factions of the PL and MDR (led by Twagiramungu), and by the PDC and the PSD.

### FPR Offensives and the Refugee Crisis

In mid-April 1994 the FPR resumed military operations from its northern stronghold, with the stated intention of relieving its beleaguered battalion in Kigali, restoring order to the capital and halting the massacre of Tutsi civilians. Grenade attacks and mortar fire intensified in the capital, prompting the UN to mediate a fragile 60-hour cease-fire, during which small evacuation forces from several countries escorted foreign nationals out of Rwanda. Belgium's UNAMIR contingent of more than 400 troops was also withdrawn, after Hutu militiamen killed 10 Belgian peace-keepers sent to protect Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, who was also murdered.

As the political violence incited by the presidential guard and the *Interahamwe* gathered momentum, the militia's identification of all Tutsi as political opponents of the state promoted ethnic polarization, resulting in a pogrom against Tutsi. Reports of mass Tutsi killings and unprovoked attacks on fleeing Tutsi refugees, and on those seeking refuge in schools, hospitals and churches, elicited unqualified international condemnation and outrage, and promises of financial and logistical aid for an estimated 2m. displaced Rwandans (some 250,000 had fled across the border to Tanzania in a 24-hour period in late April 1994), many of whom were killed by famine and disease in makeshift camps. By late May attempts to assess the full scale of the humanitarian catastrophe in Rwanda were complicated by unverified reports that the FPR (which claimed to control more than one-half of the country) was carrying out retaliatory atrocities against Hutu militias and civilians. Unofficial estimates indicated that between 200,000 and 500,000 Rwandans had been killed since early April.

On 21 April 1994 the UN Security Council resolved to reduce its force in Rwanda to 270 personnel, a move that attracted criticism from the Rwandan Government, the FPR and international relief organizations. However, on 16 May, following intense international pressure and the disclosure of the vast scale of the humanitarian crisis in the region, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 917, providing for the eventual

deployment of some 5,500 UN troops with a revised mandate, including the policing of Kigali's airport and the protection of refugees in designated 'safe areas'. In late May 1994 the UN Secretary-General criticized the failure of the UN member nations to respond to his invitation to participate in the enlarged force (only Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal had agreed to provide small contingents). Further UN-sponsored attempts to negotiate a cease-fire failed in late May and early June, and the FPR made significant territorial gains in southern Rwanda, forcing the Government to flee Gitarama and seek refuge in the western town of Kibuye.

In early June 1994 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 925, whereby the mandate of the revised UN mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR II) was extended until December. However, the UN Secretary-General encountered considerable difficulty in securing equipment and armaments requested by the African countries that had agreed to participate. By mid-June confirmed reports of retributive murders committed by FPR members and the collapse of a fragile truce, negotiated at a summit meeting of the OAU, prompted the French Government to announce its willingness to lead an armed police action, endorsed by the UN, in Rwanda. Although France insisted that its military presence (expected to total 2,000 troops) would maintain strict political neutrality and operate, from the border regions, in a purely humanitarian capacity pending the arrival of a multinational UN force, the FPR was vehemently opposed to its deployment, citing the French administration's maintenance of high-level contacts with representatives of the self-proclaimed Rwandan Government as an indication of political bias. On 23 June the first contingent of 150 French marine commandos launched 'Operation Turquoise', entering the western town of Cyangugu, in preparation for a large-scale operation to protect refugees in the area. By mid-July the French initiative had successfully relieved several beleaguered Tutsi communities and had established a temporary 'safe haven' for the displaced population in the south-west, through which a mass exodus of Hutu refugees began to flow, encouraged by reports (disseminated by supporters of the defeated interim Government) that the advancing FPR forces were seeking violent retribution against Hutu. An estimated 1m. Rwandans sought refuge in the border town of Goma, in Zaire, while a similar number attempted to cross the border elsewhere in the south-west. The FPR had swiftly secured all major cities and strategic territorial positions, but had halted its advance several kilometres from the boundaries of the French-controlled neutral zone, requesting the apprehension and return for trial of those responsible for the recent atrocities. (At the end of June the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Rwanda—appointed in May—urged the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate allegations of genocide; in early July the UN announced the creation of a commission of inquiry for this purpose.)

### THE FPR TAKES POWER

On 19 July 1994 Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, was inaugurated as President for a five-year term. In November a multi-party protocol of understanding was concluded, providing for a number of amendments to the terms of the August 1993 Arusha Accord, relating to the establishment of a transitional legislature. The most notable of the new provisions was the exclusion from the legislative process of members of those parties implicated in alleged acts of genocide during 1994. A 70-member National Transitional Assembly was installed on 12 December. On 5 May 1995 the new legislature announced its adoption of a new Constitution based on selected articles of the 1991 Constitution, the terms of the August 1993 Arusha Accord, the FPR's victory declaration of July 1994 and the November 1994 multi-party protocol of understanding.

In July 1999 Rwanda announced the end of the five-year transitional Government and its replacement by a four-year national unity Government. The new transitional period permitted the Government to complete the national reconciliation process, restore internal security, improve the economy and social services and establish a democratic system. Critics rejected the unilateral extension of political power and claimed

that the Government's action revealed its undemocratic and dictatorial nature.

The increasingly stringent policies of the Government, which by this stage was dominated by supporters of Vice-President and FPR Chairman, Paul Kagame, prompted an increasing number of prominent figures to flee Rwanda. A notable case involved the popular Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly, Kabuye Sebarenzi, who had campaigned for good governance and official accountability. After moving from the FPR to the PL and drawing attention to government ministers accused of corruption, Sebarenzi's political fortunes gradually waned. In December 1999 the PL President, Pio Mugabo, postponed the vote for a new party President, reportedly on orders from Kagame. Sebarenzi had been expected to be elected to this post, which would have strengthened his chances of winning the election for the national presidency. In early January 2000 the Transitional National Assembly forced Sebarenzi's resignation on apparently fabricated charges of official misconduct, organizing genocide survivors against the Government and supporting the 'army of the king'. Later that month Sebarenzi, who feared that the Government would assassinate him, fled to Uganda, then to Europe, and finally to the USA. On 23 March President Pasteur Bizimungu resigned and subsequently relocated to the USA. Kagame served as provisional President until 17 April, when members of the legislature and the Government elected him, by 81 votes to five, as the first Tutsi President since Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962. Kagame, who was to serve for the remainder of the transition period, until legislative and presidential elections in 2003, pledged to facilitate political decentralization, expedite the trials of some 125,000 genocide suspects in prison and conduct local government elections.

In September 1999 a legislative commission of inquiry implicated several government ministers in cases of corruption, some of whom subsequently resigned. A further parliamentary inquiry discovered that, when he was Minister of Education in 1995, the Prime Minister, Pierre-Célestin Rwigyema, had been implicated in the diversion of funds from a World Bank education programme almost exclusively to his home town of Gitarama. Rwigyema survived a motion of censure in the Transitional National Assembly in December 1999, but he resigned in February 2000. In March 2004 the Auditor-General, Gervais Ntaganda, informed the legislature that some 60 public institutions reported that tenders valued at US \$5.8m. for 2002 had not been processed by the national tender board, as scheduled. Moreover, \$7m. of government spending was unaccounted for during that year and, of 44 cases of alleged embezzlement of government funds, only nine were referred for trial and only two cases had been heard. However, the authorities did dismiss 139 police-officers in March 2004 for a series of crimes, including bribery and corruption, although allegations of corruption among senior government officials remained uninvestigated.

On 29 June 2000 the Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs introduced legislation on decentralization, which aimed to make the district (*akarere*) the principal organ of local government. Apart from providing judicial services, the *akarere* was to assume responsibility for agriculture, extension, forestry and veterinary services. Other *akarere* duties included the stimulation of local trade and small-scale industries, education and teacher training, and the supervision of health, water, fire brigades, co-operatives, roads, land titles and tourism services. A legislative council and an executive committee, aided by an executive secretary, were to govern the *akarere*. This initiative was the most ambitious political scheme ever undertaken in post-independence Rwanda. Its success or failure depended on the availability of donor aid, the authorities' ability to collect taxes and the central Government's willingness to transfer adequate funds and power to the *akarere*. Many donors insisted that, in order to receive foreign aid, Rwanda would have to shed its authoritarian culture and near-total concentration of power in the central Government.

On 24 July 2000 former Prime Minister Rwigyema, the leader of the MDR, fled from Rwanda and sought political asylum in the USA, deeply embarrassing the Kagame regime. The Hutu-dominated MDR responded to Rwigyema's self-

imposed exile by removing him from the presidency of the movement and denouncing him after he issued a statement condemning Kagame as a dictator. The MDR subsequently elected Célestin Kabanda, who enjoyed considerable support among Rwanda's Hutu population, as its new President.

In October 2000 Rwanda convened a Summit on Reconciliation and Unity. However, this measure failed to convince opponents of the Government that Kagame was serious about national reconciliation. As a result, political opposition to the Kagame regime continued, particularly in Rwandan expatriate communities. In May 2001 Alexandre Kimenyi, a former senior FPR member who had relocated to the USA, announced the formation of an opposition party, the Alliance rwandaise pour la renaissance de la nation (ARENA). He maintained that membership of the organization was open to all Rwandans and denied allegations that it was pro-monarchy. Despite its increasing popularity among some expatriates, ARENA was unable to form a credible opposition to Kagame's Government.

### ELECTIONS AND THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

On 6 March 2001 nation-wide elections for local officials were conducted in Rwanda. A high proportion of eligible voters participated in the polls. President Kagame claimed that the elections represented a significant measure towards democratization. However, Rwandan government statistics indicated that about 45% of the districts were contested by only one candidate. Moreover, according to the US-based human rights organization Human Rights Watch, irregularities marred the elections from the outset. Many voters also claimed they participated in the polls because they feared receiving fines or other penalties if they did not. In addition, local and international election monitors only received the requisite documentation late on the day before the elections, making it impossible to observe pre-election activities, such as registration, and difficult to reach distant polling stations.

On 26 May 2003 some 93.4% of the electorate approved a new Constitution. The European Union (EU) Electoral Observation Mission in Rwanda subsequently reported that the referendum had been conducted in 'satisfactory conditions'. The Constitution mandated a bicameral legislature, which would comprise an 80-member Chamber of Deputies and a 26-member Senate. Also that month the Government endorsed a parliamentary report that urged the banning of the MDR for propagating a 'divisive' ideology and the prosecution of 47 of its members and supporters for 'ethnic extremism'. Amnesty International accused the Rwandan authorities of orchestrated suppression of political opposition, and Human Rights Watch maintained that the Government was seeking to eliminate any opposition prior to Rwanda's presidential and parliamentary elections, due to be held in August and September, respectively. On 4 June the new Constitution entered into effect. However, the International Federation for Human Rights claimed that the Constitution would inhibit multi-party pluralism and freedom of expression and recommended that the Rwandan authorities guarantee such rights. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Twagiramungu announced that he would contest the presidential election against Kagame.

On 25 August 2003 Kagame won the first election to take place in Rwanda since the 1994 genocide, with 95.1% of the valid votes cast. Twagiramungu subsequently accused the authorities of electoral malpractice, and submitted a challenge against the official results to the Supreme Court. EU monitors confirmed that irregularities had occurred, although a South African observer mission declared that the poll had been 'free and fair'. In early September the Supreme Court rejected Twagiramungu's appeal. Kagame was officially inaugurated on 12 September. Official figures indicated that some 96% of registered voters participated in the legislative election on 30 September, although independent observers maintained that the number of voters was less than the presidential poll. The FPR won 33 seats; the PSD secured seven seats, the PL six, the Parti démocrate chrétien three, the Parti démocrate islamique two, the Parti socialiste rwandais one and the Union démocratique du peuple rwandais one. The new Constitution reserved the remaining seats in the Chamber of Deputies for

'special groups' (24 women's representatives, two youth representatives and one representative of disabled persons). On 2 October some 20,000 representatives of provincial women's groups contested the 24 seats reserved for women, while local government officials and academic representatives contested 14 of the 26 Senate seats. On 9 October President Kagame appointed eight senators, as authorized by the Constitution. (A further four senators were nominated by a regulatory body, the Parties' Forum.) The EU assessed, however, that there were serious irregularities in the presidential and legislative elections.

In 2004–05 the Kagame administration accused several government officials of promoting the 'ideology of genocide'. In July 2004, the Chamber of Deputies published a report accusing several local civil society organizations, including the Ligue rwandaise pour la promotion et la défense des droits de l'homme (LIPRODHOR), one of Rwanda's largest human rights organizations, of supporting such an ideology. The EU condemned the findings, and the Government rejected the legislature's recommendation for a ban on all suspect organizations. Nevertheless, eight LIPRODHOR officials fled to Uganda, claiming they were in danger from government agents. In September LIPRODHOR's general assembly, having been obliged by the Government to conduct an internal investigation, issued a statement denouncing some of its members for 'genocide-related acts' and seeking forgiveness from the Government and the Rwandan people. In early January 2005 the legislature renewed its accusations that LIPRODHOR was propagating a genocidal ideology and ethnic divisionism. The Government ordered the organization to conduct an internal investigation to expose 'divisionists'. The subsequent chaos forced LIPRODHOR to cease operations. On 28 September 2004 President Kagame dismissed three ministers (responsible for the interior, health, and youth, culture and sports) for poor performance, and accused many other officials of divisionist activities.

Legislative elections, held on 15 September 2008, were largely deemed to have been free and fair and international observers praised the Commission électorale nationale (CNE) for the orderly manner in which the ballot was prepared and conducted. Provisional results released by the CNE indicated that President Kagame's ruling FPR-led coalition consolidated its parliamentary majority, securing 78.8% of the votes and increasing the number of seats in Parliament from 40 to 42. The PSD took seven and the PL four. Voter turn-out was high, estimated to have been 98.5%.

### POST-GENOCIDE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

On 8 November 1994, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 955, establishing the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to be convened in Arusha, Tanzania, despite the negative vote of Rwanda, which coincidentally held a non-permanent seat on the Council in 1994. The ICTR began formal proceedings in late November 1995 and the first trial began in January 1997. In 2003 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1503, which urged the ICTR to establish a strategy, popularly known as its 'Completion Strategy,' which would enable the tribunal to reach its goal of completing investigations by the end of 2004, trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, and all work in 2010. By 21 August 2007, the date of the ICTR's most recent annual report, the ICTR had imposed 27 judgments, involving 33 accused. Several of these decisions established important international criminal law precedents concerning the definition of crimes (particularly genocide and rape) and the accountability of perpetrators, regardless of their position.

In February 1996 the Rwandan Prime Minister announced the creation of special courts within the country's existing judicial system. Under these arrangements, Rwanda's Supreme Court Chief Prosecutor began investigations in each of the country's 10 districts, and established three-member judicial panels in each district to consider cases; the panels were to comprise some 250 lay magistrates. Additionally, 320 judicial police inspectors compiled dossiers on those detained for allegedly committing genocide. Newly established

assessment commissions reviewed possible detentions on the basis of available evidence.

In mid-August 2004 the ICTR Chief Prosecutor, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, who had been appointed by the UN Security Council on 15 September 2003, visited Rwanda to review the Government's proposal that at least some of those convicted by the ICTR of committing atrocities should serve their sentences in Rwandan prisons. The ICTR had initially opposed this strategy as Rwanda employs the death penalty, while the maximum ICTR sentence is life imprisonment. Kagame suggested a compromise whereby Rwanda would retain the death penalty, but waive it for those convicted by the ICTR. In June 2007 legislation was adopted removing the death penalty from all national statutes. In response, the ICTR commenced proceedings to transfer five un-named suspects from Arusha to the national courts in Kigali. By mid-2007 Jallow had submitted 30 case files for prosecution by Rwanda's national courts. To further facilitate the ICTR's completion strategy Jallow entered into negotiations with various states to transfer some cases to their national jurisdictions. Some of these nations had already made progress on their own prosecutions related to the genocide. In Belgium, in July 2007, Maj. Bernard Ntuyahaga, who had served in the Rwandan army, was convicted and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for his involvement in the murder of 10 Belgian UN peace-keepers in the first week of the genocide.

During his 2003 visit to Rwanda, Jallow declined to answer questions about whether the ICTR intended to prosecute anyone from the FPR for crimes against humanity, prompting speculation that prosecution of FPR members would end the Rwandan Government's co-operation with the ICTR. In November Jallow revealed that 14 alleged *génocidaires* (perpetrators of the 1994 genocide) had taken refuge in the DRC and accused the Congolese authorities of failing to make any effort to apprehend them. In mid-December the ICTR's Appeals Chamber upheld the convictions of two defendants who had been sentenced in February 2003 to 10 and 25 years' imprisonment, respectively, for their role in the 1994 genocide in the province of Kibuye. In January 2005 Jallow announced that he was ready to proceed with 17 new genocide trials, which would coincide with 25 ongoing trials. He also indicated that national courts would conduct some of these trials (for example, in early 2006 the ICTR announced that Norway would become the first non-African state to try a case at the ICTR's request) and that his office had completed investigations into another 16 cases, some of which he claimed concerned alleged FPR atrocities. In mid-2005 the ICTR renewed its demand for prosecutions against members of the FPR for war crimes. The alleged implication of the FPR in shooting down the aircraft of President Habyarimana in 1994 was of particular interest to the Tribunal. In response, Aloys Mutabingwa, Rwanda's ICTR representative, demanded that the ICTR charge French government officials for their role in the events that precipitated the genocide. Despite such declarations, no prosecutions of FPR or French officials have occurred.

The Rwandan national courts, operating concurrently to the ICTR, have also played a major role in prosecuting genocide suspects. This has been a difficult undertaking, in view of the decimation of the Rwandan judiciary by the genocide. Despite significant reconstruction of the judiciary since then, the system has had difficulties in dealing with the immense number of imprisoned genocide suspects awaiting trial. By late 2003 Rwandan courts had convicted approximately 6,500 suspects, of which 600–700 received death sentences.

To relieve the pressure on its courts and to facilitate a communal dialogue on the root causes of the genocide as a means to reconciliation, the Rwandan Government instituted the *gacaca* community-based judicial system, founded partly on a traditional model of participative justice, to deal with the majority of genocide cases. In October 2000 the Transitional National Assembly adopted legislation providing for the creation of *gacaca* courts; this was approved by the Constitutional Court on 18 January 2001. In October voters elected approximately 260,000 *gacaca* judges, who were to facilitate the community's evidence-gathering process during open-air hearings, to evaluate evidence and to impose judgments on genocide suspects. Suspects who confessed to their crimes early enough

were able to benefit from the *gacaca* courts' plea-bargaining structure, which incorporated community service for certain lower-level genocide crimes. The Government pledged that all court proceedings would be publicized and all court decisions subject to appeal.

On 18 June 2002 the authorities formally inaugurated the *gacaca* system. However, for the first three years of operation, *gacaca* trials involved only the community's recording of basic information related to the events of the genocide, rather than specific evidence related to particular genocide suspects. The community courts, of which 673 commenced operations throughout the country in November, followed by a further 8,258 in March 2003, were designed to expedite the trials of those accused of crimes relating to the 1994 genocide, to reveal the truth about what happened, to end the culture of impunity in Rwanda, and to promote national reconciliation through communal dialogue and the face-to-face engagement of genocide suspects and survivors.

The Government had undertaken to begin trials for 750 genocide suspects in September 2004 using the *gacaca* system, but this process was delayed until 2005. Meanwhile, in December 2004 the Gacaca Commission reported that it would use lists of genocide suspects that the Netherlands-based NGO Penal Reform International had earlier rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that they presumed guilt. Hearings of genocide suspects' cases before nearly 9,000 *gacaca* tribunals ultimately commenced on 10 March 2005. Defendants have included several current government officials, and Prime Minister Bernard Makuza and the Minister of Defence, Gen. Marcel Gatsinzi, provided testimony. It appeared that Makuza would not be liable for prosecution, but Gatsinzi, a former commander of the *École des sous-officiers* in Butare, was accused of providing weapons to Hutu troops to kill Tutsi. Gatsinzi admitted that some military personnel under his command had been involved in killings, but rejected allegations that he had assisted them.

As the Rwandan Government claims that up to 1m. suspects might eventually be charged with genocide during *gacaca* hearings, the Prosecutor-General has warned that the Government must change its judicial strategy as the *gacaca* system would be unable to process so many cases. *Gacaca* hearings were further complicated in early 2005 when thousands of Hutu reportedly fled to neighbouring countries to avoid possible prosecution through *gacaca*. In Burundi, for example, UNHCR initially granted refugee status to some 2,000 recently arrived Rwandans. However, after complaints from the Rwandan Government, Burundi released a statement indicating that the Rwandans would not be granted refugee status, that it would urge them to return home and that it would initiate extradition proceedings against those who refused. Additionally, it was announced in October 2006 that France, Belgium and the Netherlands had agreed to seek those who had taken up residence in those countries and bring them to trial.

In July 2006 phase two of the *gacaca* system began. In January 2008 President Kagame indicated that the *gacaca* process would be completed by the end of the year, although it appeared likely that it would continue into 2009. *Gacaca* has prosecuted genocide cases much more slowly than expected, due primarily to the large numbers of new genocide suspects that have been identified during hearings, in addition to approximately 120,000 suspects initially identified in the direct aftermath of the genocide. In May 2008 President Kagame also announced that *gacaca* would begin prosecuting a small number of cases involving the main orchestrators of the genocide, which would ordinarily be dealt with by the national courts. The purpose of this was to clear the backlog of the most serious cases from the national courts and enable them to handle cases transferred from the ICTR.

## HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEE ISSUES

According to the US State Department's human rights report for 2006, released on 6 March 2007, Rwanda's record remained poor, but improvements had been made even over the past year. Specifically, the report claimed that Rwandan authorities continued to commit serious abuses and to restrict the right of citizens to elect a different government. Security

forces, such as the Local Defence Forces, reportedly committed unlawful killings and employed torture and excessive force. Police often mistreated suspects, and prison conditions remained life-threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly of opposition supporters, and prolonged pre-trial detention remained serious problems. Due process or expeditious trials often did not occur and genocide trials continued to move slowly. There were restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press, and limited freedom of association, assembly and religion. Other problems cited in the report included child labour, human trafficking, social violence and discrimination against women and ethnic minorities, particularly the Batwa. Various international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, expressed similar concerns.

The record of the *Armée patriotique rwandaise* (APR—the FPR's military wing) in eastern DRC has alarmed many international human rights organizations, owing to consistent reports of the APR's executions, rape, forcible removal of people and other abuses. An increasing number of people from the Kivu provinces of eastern DRC, especially non-Banyarwanda, strongly oppose the APR because of its harsh treatment of local populations. Many non-Banyarwanda have joined anti-Rwandan Mai-Mai militias to combat the APR and its Banyarwanda allies. In the process, the Mai Mai and other rebel groups have killed hundreds of Tutsi civilians in eastern DRC. In May 2000 Human Rights Watch released a report, entitled *Eastern Congo Ravaged*, which outlined the atrocities committed by the APR.

In November 2002 the International Crisis Group (ICG) criticized Rwanda's poor human rights record, particularly regarding the country's activities in eastern DRC. In June 2003 Rwanda and Burundi agreed to co-operate in bringing stability to the Great Lakes region by supporting peace efforts in Burundi and the DRC. Kagame promised to convince armed Burundian groups to implement the cease-fire agreements that had been signed with the Government of Burundi. In October Rwanda announced that it would create a commission of inquiry to investigate two cases of alleged resource exploitation in the DRC, but the Government continued to dismiss reports of human rights violations by Rwandan troops in the DRC as uninformed and biased. In April 2004 Rwanda deployed troops along its border with Burundi and the DRC, in anticipation of possible attacks from Hutu rebels. Burundi accused Rwandan government forces of invading Ruhororo and Kaburantwa Valley, in the north-western province of Cibitoke, and demanded their withdrawal. The Burundian authorities subsequently announced that Rwanda had complied with the request.

### REGIONAL CONCERNS

Rwanda's 1997 military intervention in the DRC marked a turning point in Central Africa's history. The Kagame Government justified its actions by claiming that its armed forces sought only to eliminate Hutu extremist elements there. However, it soon became evident that Rwandan troops, together with their Ugandan counterparts, had also started a systematic campaign to loot the region's resources. Efforts by the UN and the international community to prevent this illegal exploitation failed. Meanwhile, by 2004 various international human rights organizations believed that more than 4m. had died in eastern DRC as a result of warfare, disease and starvation. In June Col Jules Mutebutsi, a Congolese Tutsi rebel commander, and a number of his troops had sought refuge in Rwanda, after clashing with personnel of the UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in Bukavu. UNHCR refused to grant refugee status to Mutebutsi and his troops until it received proof that they were no longer combatants. In late August the Rwandan Government sought to placate the UN by moving Mutebutsi and his soldiers from a temporary camp, known as Ntendezi, near the DRC border, to a camp in the remote district of Gikongoro province, known as Coko. However, this measure failed to allay UN fears that Mutebutsi and his followers remained combatants. The UN also accused the Kagame Government of arming dissident militias in the DRC's Ituri

district in Province Orientale and operating a military training camp in Kibungo province for abductees from the Kiziba and Gihembe refugee camps. Rwanda denied the allegations. On 13 August Rwanda blamed the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR), regarded as the successor force to the former Rwandan army and containing *Interahamwe* militia members who fled to the DRC after the 1994 genocide, for killing 152 Congolese Tutsi refugees in the Burundian Gatumba refugee camp, near the border with the DRC. The Rwandan Government threatened to deploy troops in the DRC unless MONUC and the Congolese authorities took action, and additionally demanded that MONUC abandon its ineffective, voluntary disarmament programme for the FDLR. MONUC responded that its efforts to disarm the FDLR had failed because Rwanda and its DRC-based allies continued to carry out military operations in eastern DRC that disrupted its operations. Additionally, MONUC accused Rwanda of using FDLR activities as justification for re-intervention in the DRC.

In September 2004 the UN announced that the Rwandan and DRC Governments had agreed to launch a Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) to enhance border security. In early November the DRC armed forces and MONUC commenced joint missions in the Walungu district of Sud-Kivu province to persuade the FDLR to disarm and return home. Shortly after, the FDLR launched a rocket attack on Rwanda's Gisenyi province from Nord-Kivu. Also in November Kagame warned the AU that Rwandan troops would intervene in the DRC if the armed forces and MONUC failed to disarm the FDLR. The UN, the EU, the United Kingdom, the USA, Belgium, South Africa and other countries cautioned Kagame about intervening in the DRC, while many donors, including the Swedish Government, suspended aid to the Rwandan Government. On 1 December MONUC reported that there were around 100 Rwandan troops in the Virunga mountains along the Rwanda–DRC–Uganda border. According to the DRC Government, these troops had been fighting the FDLR in Nord-Kivu for at least a week; however, the Rwandan Government denied that it had any forces in the DRC. In early December DRC armed reinforcements clashed with military units of dissidents loyal to the pro-Rwanda *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD) in Kanyabayonga, Nord-Kivu. However, the DRC Government maintained that the incident involved its armed forces and invading Rwandan troops. The JVM investigated the matter, but was unable to confirm whether Rwandan troops had participated in the fighting. Nevertheless, MONUC suspected that Rwanda provided military aid to the RCD. On 20 December the Rwandan Government responded to growing international criticism by announcing that it would no longer intervene in the DRC. On 31 March 2005 the FDLR unexpectedly condemned the 1994 genocide, pledged to co-operate with the ICTR and announced that it was willing to end its armed struggle, begin disarmament on 5 May, and eventually return to Rwanda. These concessions resulted from secret discussions in Rome, Italy, between the rebels and the Roman Catholic Sant'Egidio community. Much of the international community welcomed this initiative. However, the FDLR has since continued its campaign of violence in the Kivus, aimed mainly at the Congolese Tutsi population. In the territory of Walungu of South Kivu alone, it is estimated that since 2002 the FDLR has raped 12,000 women, mostly Banyarwanda.

Rwanda-Uganda relations remained tense, primarily since the Ugandan authorities believed that the Rwandan Government was aiding the self-styled People's Redemption Army (PRA), a rebel group that reportedly was linked to an opposition leader until recently in exile, Col Kizza Besigye. The Rwandan Government rejected such accusations. In November 2004 Uganda expelled a Rwandan diplomat, James Wizeye, for espionage and for co-operating with the PRA, which supposedly aimed to overthrow President Museveni's Government. Rwanda retaliated by expelling a Ugandan diplomat. Shortly afterwards Ugandan security forces arrested three UPDF soldiers for selling information to Wizeye. Rwandan officials denied these charges and accused Ugandan government elements of seeking to damage relations between the two countries. In April 2005 Rwanda announced that it had detained a UPDF officer, Capt. David Mugambe, on espionage charges. Mugambe claimed to be fleeing political

persecution in Uganda, but the Ugandan Government maintained that he was sought by the authorities for providing weapons to criminals.

There are growing signs of regional integration between Rwanda and its neighbours. On 1 July 2007 Rwanda joined the East African Community, which also comprises Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi and seeks to facilitate greater political, social and economic co-operation in the region. Rwanda's bilateral relations with the DRC have also improved since November 2007 when a summit in Nairobi, Kenya, between the two Governments resulted in an agreement that the Congolese Government would disarm the FDLR and other Hutu rebels operating in eastern DRC and hand over to the ICTR genocide suspects within these armed groups. In December 2007 the US-sponsored Tripartite Plus Joint Commission meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, involving representatives of the Governments of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC, led to resolutions on strengthening joint security measures in the region and eliminating threats to regional peace, such as those posed by the FDLR and other rebel forces.

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Despite Rwanda's alleged poor record in the areas of governance and human rights, the Government retained the support of much of the international community. However, Rwanda's relations with some European countries remained uneven, largely owing to the legacies of the 1994 genocide. In March 2004 the French daily newspaper *Le Monde* reported that a French magistrate's study had determined that Kagame had ordered the shooting down of Habyarimana's plane, which had precipitated the 1994 genocide. In response, Kagame asserted that France 'supplied weapons, and, working alongside Hutu Government extremists, gave orders, to the perpetrators of the genocide'. The Rwandan Government established a commission in October 2006 to investigate France's role in the Rwandan genocide. The French Government maintained that French peace-keeping troops had saved 'several hundred thousand lives' during the killings. In November a French judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, issued arrest warrants for Kagame and nine of his associates, alleging that they were involved in the assassination of Habyarimana. Rwanda immediately severed relations with France, ordering the French ambassador and other diplomats in Rwanda to leave the country. To further demonstrate its split from France and its historic sphere of influence in Africa, in December Rwanda stated its desire to join the Commonwealth. In February 2008 a Spanish judge, Fernando Andreu, issued an indictment

against 40 Rwandan military and political leaders charging them with engaging in revenge killings after the genocide. Kagame, whom the judge also accused of committing crimes, dismissed the accusations.

In March 2003 Kagame met with President George W. Bush and other senior US officials to discuss bilateral relations, trade and development, the effect of HIV/AIDS and peace and security in the Great Lakes region. In December the US Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, visited Rwanda to assess the impact of US aid on Rwanda's HIV/AIDS epidemic.

In May 2004 Belgium, which earlier had apologized for its failure to intervene to stop the genocide, pledged €75m. over a three-year period for Rwanda's health, education, and development sectors. The Rwandan Government planned to use the funds to improve the country's medical infrastructure, introduce universal primary education and facilitate small-scale, rural income generating activities to reduce poverty levels.

In mid-April 2004 156 Rwandan soldiers arrived in the Darfur region of western Sudan to protect the AU observer mission there (see the chapter on Sudan). These were the first foreign troops to arrive in Darfur, and the Rwandan Government was widely commended internationally for sending them. In his valedictory address to the contingent, Kagame announced that he expected the troops to defend Sudanese civilians as well as to protect AU observers. In November Rwanda dispatched another military contingent to Darfur, bringing its total personnel strength in the AU mission to around 400 troops. In February 2005 Kagame visited the Rwandan troops in Darfur and met with the Sudanese President, Lt-Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, for discussions. The Rwandan President maintained that he was acting in co-operation with Sudan to resolve the Darfur crisis, while Bashir declared that the two countries were linked by a 'common concern' for peace. When he returned to Rwanda, Kagame urged the AU to increase the number of troops in Darfur, claiming that, after the experiences of Rwanda in 1994, the international community could not allow another genocide to occur in Darfur. By mid-2007 six Rwandan peace-keepers had been killed during fighting in Darfur. In a February 2008 visit to Rwanda, Bush applauded Rwanda's international efforts, including its contribution to resolving the Darfur crisis, while also announcing that the Peace Corps, which left Rwanda in 1993, would return. By 2008 Rwanda had made significant progress in economics, technology, education, health care, and tourism, such that many observers were heralding it as a model for African growth in these industries.

## Economy

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### INTRODUCTION

Rwanda has two main physical obstacles to economic development: the extreme population density and the distance from the sea. The population problem with its concomitant effect on food resources, is aggravated by soil erosion caused by leaching and other natural factors. In 2007, according to estimates by the IMF, Rwanda's gross domestic product (GDP) was US \$3,321m.

Rwanda's economy took a long time to recover from the 1994 genocide, which, among other shocks, saw around one-quarter of the country's population flee to neighbouring countries and almost wiped out the cattle stock. The Government's three-year programme of rehabilitation and reconciliation for 1996–98 aimed to restore the economy to the level of its 1990

achievements. However, the Government only considered that GDP had equalized with pre-genocide levels at the end of 2001. Overall GDP increased, in real terms, at an average annual rate of 6.8% in 1996–2006. Real economic growth in 2006 and 2007 was lower, at 5.5% and 6.0%, respectively, according to the IMF, although this was partially due to the average growth numbers for the ten years to 2006 being buoyed by relatively low base figures. In 2007 output of coffee, which has traditionally been the country's leading export, was very disappointing, with a crop of only 15,000 metric tons, partly due to a heavy preponderance of mature trees the previous year. Moreover, despite higher coffee prices on international markets, earnings from coffee exports were US \$35.7m. in 2007, compared with \$54.0m. in 2006. Earnings from the tea crop in 2007 were also disappointing. This meant that output in

the agricultural sector as a whole contracted in 2007. However, strong growth in the financial, tourism and information technology sectors all provided support to real economic output in 2007. Construction also provided a boost, with the capital city, Kigali, continuing to experience a boom. In May 2008 the IMF pronounced that economic performance in 2007 was 'satisfactory,' after completion of its fourth review under a \$12.7m. programme, boding well for the continued provision of loans and related aid.

As with nearly all countries world-wide—and particularly those where food makes up a very high proportion of the consumer basket—Rwanda experienced a rise in inflation during 2008, due to soaring soft commodity prices. The annual inflation rate reached 11% in March 2008, but then declined to below 9% in May. With inflation under 10% in such a challenging environment, it remained clear that the central bank and the Government were continuing to maintain strong macro-economic discipline. The Rwanda franc was trading at around 538 per US dollar in July 2008, slightly stronger than at the beginning of the year (the currency had already been very stable in dollar terms over a period of five years). The strength of economic management has been a key factor behind ongoing donor support, with aid continuing to account for close to 50% of the country's budget.

In June 2008 the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, James Musoni, provided an upbeat assessment of Rwanda's economic prospects. He announced that economic growth was on course to register 7% in 2008, despite problems caused by political unrest in Kenya earlier in the year. The first quarter of 2008 had seen significant disruption to normal business activity in Rwanda, owing to election-related violence in Kenya, which blocked the landlocked country's fuel supply and export of goods and produce. However, more positively favourable weather in late 2007 produced a good harvest in Rwanda during early 2008, and the authorities were confident of a significant improvement in the coffee crop. For 2009 Musoni forecast that real economic growth would register between 7% and 8%. Behind this optimistic forecast lay confidence that the service sector, particularly banking and information and communications technology (ICT), would remain strong.

Rwanda expected to complete two key privatizations during 2008: Banque de Kigali and the national airline Rwandair Express. A 70% stake in the former was made available, while a 40% stake in the latter was offered. British bank Barclays was expected to make an offer for Banque de Kigali, while Italy's Meridiana and Belgium's Brussels Airlines submitted offers for Rwandair Express.

## AGRICULTURE

### Agricultural Production

The IMF stated in February 2008 that commitment to agricultural reform was crucial to the outlook for Rwanda's economy, with Deputy Managing Director Murilo Portugal underlining that modernizing the industry to ensure food security and develop farming infrastructure represented particularly important challenges. This followed the release of a report by the UN Development Programme in July 2007, which maintained that the country need to deal urgently with the problems generated by deficient agriculture investment and high population growth. Rwanda's population stood at 10.0m. by 2008, with a population growth rate of close to 3% per year and it is the most densely populated country in Africa. In this context, the IMF reported in July 2008 that the Rwandan Government was formulating a broad-based agricultural reform plan, elements of which would include soil conservation. The World Bank was expected to undertake an evaluation of the plan's financial viability.

Some 89.8% of the labour force were employed in the agricultural sector in 2005. The sector contributed 57.2% of total export revenue (including re-exports) in 2003. About 95% of the total value of agricultural production is provided by subsistence crops. While these have failed to meet the needs of the population, the annual increase in production of subsistence crops broadly kept pace with population growth until 1977. Since then the area of land annually made available for

subsistence crops has increased only marginally and, moreover, crop yields are declining in many areas, owing to erosion and the traditional intensive cultivation methods used. (The problem of erosion was exacerbated during 1990–94 by the felling by displaced Rwandans of trees for timber and charcoal.) This resulted in the late 1980s in increasing strains on food production, and consequently in severe food shortages. Attempts to increase the yield of small farm plots have included a recent initiative to cultivate climbing beans. In late 1989 and early 1990 many parts of the country, in particular the south, were affected by famine, following drought and crop failure. The Government first did not recognize the food problem and tried to prevent it gaining attention in the media. Subsequently, the Government had recourse to emergency food aid to avert widespread starvation.

The principal food crops are bananas, sweet potatoes, potatoes, cassava, beans, sorghum, rice, maize and peas. At the end of June 2003 humanitarian agencies warned that a severe production shortfall in the Bugesera area might result in a rapid deterioration in food security if aid to residents was not increased. Some 70,000 civilians were already experiencing conditions of moderate food insecurity, according to the UN World Food Programme (WFP). By early 2004 it was apparent that the agricultural sector would not again be able to sustain the entire population, then estimated at 8.9m. (about 1m. more than in March 1994). In January some 124,000 people were entirely dependent on food aid in the Bugesera, Kibungo and Umutara provinces, which were threatened by desertification. At the same time abundant early rainfall in January disorganized agricultural activities. Moreover, the banana plantations were suffering contamination from the Banana bunchy top and *budusiga* viruses. The Rwandan Government was concerned that the per head food availability, which had suffered a constant decline since 1980, could decrease to even lower levels, as the population was scheduled to double by 2015, unless significant productivity gains are made. However, experts from the finance and agriculture ministries believed that the challenge could be met, provided that sufficient investments were made in disseminating the use of fertilizers, limited to 5% of the farmers in 2004, and in increasing loans to the farmers: loans to agriculture indeed represented only 1% of commercial loans. It was believed that Rwanda's agricultural potential was underestimated, since the country possessed more arable land than the Nile Delta, and the success of the Kabuye Sugar Works, which by the end of 2003 had doubled its 2000 output of 3,500 metric tons, was viewed as an example of the capacity of the Rwandan agricultural sector to improve its performance.

In 2004 poor rains caused food production to fall by 1%. Nevertheless, performances varied according to products. Outputs of sorghum, beans, soya and cassava declined by 5%, 17%, 8% and 9%, respectively. However, production of maize increased by 12% and rice output by 66%, while production of bananas registered 2.6% growth. By August of that year the outlook was critical in 31 districts of the country, where an estimated population of 250,000–400,000 was expected to rely entirely on the distribution of 25,000 metric tons of food aid between September and December. The most vulnerable districts were in the south (Bugesera, Gikongoro and Butare), owing not only to drought but also to poorer soils. As a result, by November bean prices were 87% higher than in the previous year, while those of sorghum and maize were 73% and 55% higher, respectively. However, prospects began to improve in December, owing to heavy rains, and the number of people requiring food aid decreased to 110,000. In January 2005 preliminary results recorded by the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and WFP showed a 10% increase in potato production, but an 8% decrease in cassava output, mainly owing to the impact of cassava mosaic virus, in comparison with 2004.

In general terms, production of cereals is strong. Output of both maize and sorghum has been increasing over the first years of the 2000s. However, maize output is hindered by the lack of fertilizer use and soil erosion. Production of maize is estimated at 90,000 metric tons per year, compared with 160,000 tons for sorghum. Rice output remains modest (about 20,000 tons per year) but is increasing rapidly. In early 2005

the Government launched a 10-year rice development programme. Rice was selected as a 'priority crop' by the Government, since it performs well in flood-prone valleys and eases pressure on hillside land for other crops, and also because domestic demand is high. At this time it was grown on approximately 7,455 ha in Butare, Kibungo and Umutara provinces. However, it is planned to increase the cultivated area to 66,000 ha by 2016, by improved management of new areas in the marshlands, with the aim of meeting domestic requirements by 2009 and generating about US \$170m. in export earnings. A sign of improving food security was that market prices of the main staple foods fell in April 2005 in Kigali, Butare and Ruhengeri, while beans were again being exported to Uganda. Confronted with adverse climatic conditions in 2004, the Government has been concentrating on improving service delivery (agricultural extension, seed availability, land conservation education). In 2004 it pursued its tree-planting and environmental awareness campaign, partly through the introduction of monthly *Umuganda* community service to plant trees and improve the environment.

Rwanda was reviewing the first year of Africa's Comprehensive Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) in early 2008. The CAADP, managed under the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), had been adopted by the country in early 2007. The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources stated in February 2008 that the CAADP would support initiatives including crop intensification, water irrigation, fisheries (in Lake Kivu) and the cattle industry.

One sector that the Government has looked to promote from a low base is the flower industry. Land devoted to producing flowers for export expanded from 2 ha in 2005 to 42 ha in 2008. The authorities planned a further increase to 200 ha by 2010, with the industry expected to earn in US \$21m. by that stage, mainly from European markets, where Rwanda's *Dracaena Ornamental* has been particularly popular. In 2008 there were 3,600 flower farmers in Rwanda.

### Land Reform

The Government argues that land reform, aiming at freezing the dismantlement of agricultural plots and the transformation of marshes and swamps into suitable land for agriculture, will contribute to an increase in food production. Land reforms under consideration in 2004 envisaged encouraging the development of more viable plots: the current average size of less than 0.7 ha was considered too small. Agricultural research performed at Michigan State University of the USA, however, has demonstrated that small farms in Rwanda are more productive (in yield per unit of land) than large farms. In addition, the land reform programme is not only a matter of economics, but has an important political component. Poor Hutu farmers fear that they will lose or have to sell their land to rich urban Tutsi in the process of land consolidation. In general terms, Rwanda was beset by structural problems, such as low agricultural productivity, owing to the failure to make a proper transition to intensive high-value farming. The state policy of displacing a large number of rural poor to government-designated sites, which had been initiated in 1997 and pursued until early 2000, was criticized by foreign human rights organizations in June 2001. The basic aim of the reform was to substitute the dispersed habitat and create larger landholdings in order to boost productivity. However, human rights activists, while agreeing that making agriculture more productive was imperative, considered that such reforms should not be made at the expense of the poor. The US-based organization Human Rights Watch accused military officers and businessmen with government connections of having appropriated large holdings of land from the poor.

### Coffee

Revenue from coffee fluctuates considerably. After a disappointing crop in 2007, which totalled just 15,000 metric tons, the Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda—Café (OCIR—Café) announced in May 2008 that it expected output to rise by 93% year-on-year in 2008, to 29,000 tons. This was due to favourable weather in the last quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008. Coffee exports were targeted to bring in US \$50m. in 2008, compared to an IMF estimate of \$35.7m. in 2007.

Part of the reason for the poor crop in 2007 had been over-picking and a high preponderance of mature trees in 2006, with many of these mature trees giving way to new trees, which initially bring a lower yield. A further 40m. new seedlings were due to be planted in 2008. Other long-term factors supported the outlook for the coffee industry, enabling the country to move up the value-added chain. Investment was being made in washing stations, as fully washed coffee commands higher prices than unwashed coffee on international markets. As a result, the authorities planned to wash 10,000 tons of coffee in 2008, compared with 3,000 tons in 2007.

In December 2007 the US company Starbucks announced that it was opening a Starbucks Farmer Support Center for East Africa in Rwanda. The centre was to be staffed by a full-time agronomist, who would work with farmers to increase yields and quality. In a further recognition of Rwanda's ability to produce quality coffee, Starbucks announced that it would start selling Rwanda Blue Bourbon Coffee in European markets for the first time in March 2008. Moreover, the coffee would be marketed under its coveted Black Apron Exclusives range. This particular coffee is grown at between 1,700 m and 2,000 m above sea level in Cyangugu province, in south-west Rwanda.

Six years earlier, in 2002, marketing efforts had begun to produce results. Small quantities from the Maraba co-operative of producers were sold in Louisiana, USA, and purchased by the British Union Coffee Roasters company. In 2003 some US \$400,000 was invested in 10 new washing stations; the Government planned to equip the country with a further 90 stations by 2010, with the target of attaining national output of 35,000 metric tons by 2010. Both the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the OCIR—Café were involved in the programme, while the European Union (EU) announced that it would finance the modernization of the coffee sector through its stabilization of export earnings (Stabex) scheme.

Output in 2003 was disappointing, registering, at only 13,805 metric tons, a 28.9% decrease compared with the 2002 crop, owing to a severe drought. However, OCIR—Café projected an increase in production in 2004 to 20,000 tons, assuming climatic conditions proved favourable, owing to the installation of 10 new washing stations financed by the EU, which would allow a rise, from 315 tons to 1,200 tons, in production of the best quality fully washed coffee, thereby generating revenue gains of US \$1.50 per kg. In 2003, owing to slightly higher world prices, revenue from coffee exports was estimated at \$13.9m., demonstrating only a slight decline in value, compared with \$14.0m. recorded for the previous year, despite the sharp decrease in volume of the production.

The long-term objective of the Government was that the coffee and tea sectors should each generate export revenue of US \$100m. by 2010 and, thereby, together with projected revenues of \$100m. from the services sector (in particular tourism), contribute to improving the trade balance. In 2004 output increased beyond expectation, almost doubling, to 20,017 metric tons. Increased use of fertilizers and pesticides and the increase in the area under cultivation were beginning to pay dividends. This, in conjunction with higher world prices, allowed coffee to regain its position as the leading export product, with a total of \$27.5m. in export revenues (accounting for 30.5% of total exports during that year).

### Tea

As with the coffee industry, the tea industry in Rwanda is notoriously volatile, due to fluctuations in production and international prices. The two and a half years from the beginning of 2006 to the middle of 2008 neatly encapsulate how volatile resultant tea earnings can be. In 2007 tea output rose by 25% to 20,000 metric tons, from 16,000 tons in 2006, but a regional supply glut meant that earnings were less, at US \$31.6m., compared to \$31.9m. in 2006, according to estimates made by the IMF in July 2008. However, earnings in the first six months of 2008 were \$26m., almost comparable with total earnings in 2007. These earnings resulted from output of 11,000 tons, up from 9,400 tons in the first six months of 2007, despite poor rains in the north of the country and hailstorms in the west. While improved output played a part, a recovery of

prices was a bigger factor in the high revenues recorded in the first half of 2008. Indeed, average prices at the weekly auction in Kenya's Mombasa port reached \$2.2 per kg in the first half of 2008, compared with \$1.7 per kg in 2007. Poor rainfall affected Kenya (which accounts for 75% of regional tea output) more than Rwanda, squeezing regional supply and sending prices higher. In July 2008 the Rwanda Tea Authority estimated that the tea crop for the whole of 2008 would be 23,000 tons, while total revenues for the year were expected to amount to \$42m.

Rwanda has attempted to boost tea output via increased use of fertilisers and a renovation of tea stations. In 2007 three of the country's ten tea factories were modernised, doubling the capacity of the factories concerned. In July 2008 the OCIR—Thé announced that it was to move forward with its stalled privatization programme. Director-General Anthony Butera stated that he expected three factories—at Gishakura, Kitabi and Gisovu—to be privatized by the end of the year.

### Livestock

By July 1994 the livestock sector was in extreme crisis and the majority of the country's livestock had disappeared (although some cattle were introduced by refugees returning from Uganda). Limited livestock-vaccination programmes were undertaken by FAO and smaller agencies in the north-east, but the main problem remains the overstocking of cattle (and the consequent environmental strain) in this region, while livestock numbers are hopelessly insufficient elsewhere in the country. Between 1998 and 2000 livestock numbers increased from 657,137 to 732,123 head of cattle, from 192,344 to 248,345 sheep, from 481,145 to 756,522 goats and from 120,928 to 177,220 pigs, according to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. In 2001 the situation deteriorated again with an epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease, which affected five of Rwanda's 11 prefectures. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock claimed that traders who had illicitly imported cattle from Uganda and Tanzania into Rwanda had spread the disease. Owners of large herds in Rwanda's Mutara highlands who also possessed cattle in these neighbouring countries were suspected of having contributed to the contamination of Rwanda's cattle. As a result, in March the authorities declared a quarantine on these areas and prohibited the circulation of cattle, dairy products and meat from this origin.

In an attempt to stimulate dairy production and increase household income, the Government and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) began working with communities in Mutara prefecture. Since 2000 farmers have been encouraged to produce yoghurt, cheese and cooking fat. By early 2005 some livestock numbers were approaching pre-war levels. According to government statistics, the numbers of cattle and poultry had reached 88% and 70% of the levels recorded in 1994, but the proportion was 30% for goats. In order to boost milk output, Rwanda has imported several hundred cows from Germany and South Africa; these are more productive than the local Ankole breed but more vulnerable to disease. In early 2005 an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in livestock herds necessitated the quarantining of six districts in four provinces.

The poultry sector is expanding rapidly. Fish production is also increasing rapidly, owing to the development of fisheries projects in Lake Kivu and in other smaller lakes throughout the country. From 1,300 metric tons in 1994, the total catch increased to 8,200 tons in 2006.

### Regional Effects of Conflict and Reconciliation

Following the assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected President in October 1993 and Rwanda's genocide in 1994, the threat of conflict subsequently loomed large over the wider Great Lakes region for well over a decade. Rwanda's genocide, and a consequent flood of Hutu refugees into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in July 1994, had a devastating effect on regional stability and put regional economic development into reverse, with Rwanda's post-genocide Tutsi-dominated Government twice invading its neighbour in an attempt to confront exiled Hutu genocide perpetrators. However, with the DRC holding elections in 2006—held after Rwanda officially withdrew its troops in 2002—the prospects for regional stability and development improved considerably, particularly given that DRC possesses significant mineral resources in its eastern provinces. As the prospects for a

enduring regional peace became gradually stronger, official investment in the DRC by major world powers and companies grew. This normalization of business activity would not entirely exclude Rwanda, as the business relationships built up in eastern DRC during its earlier invasions would ensure that large volumes of (legitimate) trade would continue to flow out through Rwanda in a post-war era. Additionally, the Congo river provides significant hydroelectric power generation potential, which could hugely enhance electricity supply in the Great Lakes region (and well beyond). Peace, security and development in DRC's eastern provinces could also generate significant additional work for Rwanda's incipient industry, which the Government has placed a significant emphasis on developing as a regional hub.

In terms of Rwanda's domestic regions, before 1990 the southern provinces were much poorer compared to the northern and eastern provinces. The average income per adult equivalent in Kibungo, the richest province, was three times that in Gikongoro, the poorest province. In 2000 Kibungo was still the richest province, but the average household was only 1.5 times richer than a household in Butare, now the poorest province. Interestingly, Rwanda's high performing provinces prior to the genocide (Kibungo in the east and Ruhengeri in the north) have experienced low, even negative economic growth in the conflict decade. Provinces that were poor prior to the war and genocide are still poorer than the Rwandan average, but they have experienced much stronger economic growth than the other provinces. In real terms, the growth of average income was negative in the two richest provinces and was highest in the three poorest provinces. These figures suggest that income convergence has taken place in Rwanda between poor and rich provinces. The reasons behind the convergence of formerly richer and poorer provinces is that they have been differently affected by the four conflict shocks that have hit Rwanda in the course of the nineties: civil war, genocide, mass migration and counter-insurgency.

The Government's 'Vision 2020' strategy emphasized the need for Rwanda to move away from an essentially subsistence agriculture, unable to achieve its self-sufficiency objective, towards a more market-orientated agricultural sector; this would require incentives to increase the specialization of farmers and encourage diversification. The Government's objective for 2020 was to have one-half of arable land given over to modern farms. By then, production of vegetables was targeted to have increased three-fold and dairy production five-fold. A five-fold to 10-fold rise in the value of cash crops on that recorded in 2000 was also projected. Nevertheless, US agronomists emphasized that an important requirement for meeting such an ambitious target was to halt the replacement of crops providing good soil protection, such as bananas, with cassava, which could rapidly have a deleterious effect on soil fertility. Other obstacles to be removed were the lack of fertilizers and the rapid decline in fallow fields. More research was also needed on varietal improvements to increase resistance to disease and yields for selected crops.

Water shortages have become an increasing difficulty, both in rural areas of Southern Gikongoro and Bugesera prefectures, and also in the capital, where 40% of the 600,000 inhabitants had no regular access to drinking water in 2001. The Ministry of Water and Natural Resources aimed to implement plans by 2004 to divert a large volume of water from the Nyabarongo river, 8 km from Kigali, and to increase supplies from 2009 by also pumping water from the Mutobo river, in Ruhengeri province. Resources from the ninth European Development Fund for 2002–07 were expected to finance the extension of water supply networks in the Bugesera region, which is periodically affected by drought.

### INDUSTRY

The industrial sector followed the usual pattern for less developed African states, and food-based industries predominated, with the major companies prior to 1994 being BRALIRWA, the Rwandan subsidiary of a Dutch brewery, the Régie Sucrière de Kibuy (sugar-processing) and the OVIBAR factory, producing banana wine and liquors. By July 1994 the country's political turmoil had suspended economic activity in the sector.

Factories and plants (where production had been virtually halted by power shortages earlier in the year) were looted, destroyed or abandoned. By early October, however, the BRALIRWA plant had resumed production.

In 2008 BRALIRWA gave notice of its intentions significantly to expand operations. It planned to increase the volume of its drinks production by 13% in 2008, with higher output by both its soft drinks and alcoholic drinks branches. This was in response to both an increase in domestic demand and regional demand, including in DRC's eastern provinces and Uganda. Beer production was projected to rise to above 700,000 hl, from 600,000 hl, while the planned rise for soft drinks production would be from 390,000 hl to 420,000 hl. The increased volumes were accommodated by investment in fermentation and bottling capacity, with the latter including a new soft drinks plant in Nyamyumba, in north-west Rwanda (close to the border with the DRC). Further expansion was intended, including a move into the Tanzanian market.

The 'Vision 2020' strategy projected growth in the industrial sector of 4.1% in both 2003 and 2004 and of 7.0% in 2005. A continued increase in construction activity was forecast by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning to be the main contributory factor to this growth. In 2002 the Government announced plans to reintroduce a 25% import duty on cement: this had been cut from 40% in 1997 to zero in 2000, since at that time the national producer, Cimenterie du Rwanda (CIMERWA), was unable to meet the strong demand created by government and private housing projects. Between 1995 and the end of 2001 265,229 houses were constructed, under the Government's reinstallation programme for rural inhabitants. As a result of investments made by CIMERWA to increase its capacity, the Government abolished the temporary dismantling of tariffs on cement imports in order to encourage the domestic industry. (Imported cement and raw materials for use in production of cement originating from member states of Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) were to benefit from a preferential 5% tariff.) Since 2001 CIMERWA has encountered competition from the Kenya-based East African Portland cement corporation. None the less, CIMERWA's annual output was estimated at some 100,000 metric tons in 2003, of which a small proportion of 3,922 tons was exported to the DRC and Uganda. Rwanda also became eligible in March for textile and apparel benefits under the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allow less developed countries in Africa to use imported fabrics and yarns for the production of items exported to the USA.

Industry as a whole (including mining, manufacturing, power and construction) accounted for 21.3% of GDP in 2003 (of which manufacturing contributed 8.9%). In that year expansion of 16% in the construction sector, to 65,031m. Rwanda francs, contributed to industrial growth of 5.3%, despite a decrease in the manufacturing sector affecting in particular the food, beer, soft drinks and tobacco industries, which declined by 6.9%, owing to the competition on the domestic market of imported products and high input costs. BRALIRWA's output declined from 562,200 hl to 433,400 hl during that year. In 2004, owing to acute energy shortages as well as the impact of foreign imports, the output of Utexerwa, the national textile manufacturer, contracted by 9%. Some important changes occurred in the course of 2005, with the Government's announcement of the privatization of the national schools printing company, Régie de l'Imprimerie Scolaire, of the pharmaceuticals manufacturer LABOPHAR and of four rice factories at Bugarama, Gikonko, Rwamagana and Kabuye.

### SERVICES

A key emerging sector in Rwanda is the banking industry, as the country's economy integrates more closely with fellow members of the East African Community. Rwanda Commercial Bank, the country's second biggest lender, registered a pre-tax profit of 3,500m. Rwanda francs (US \$6.4m.) in 2007, a rise of 28.5% year-on-year. The bank had been insolvent before a majority shareholding was taken by London-based private equity company Actis in 2005. The takeover enabled the bank to clean up its loan book (which had been clogged by

non-performing assets dating back to the genocide). The strong profit recorded in 2007 would enable the bank to continue expanding its operations, helping to boost the extension of credit to private enterprises in the Rwandan economy, which has long been held back by a deficient banking infrastructure. The bank intended to open new branches across the country and increase automatic teller machines in 2008 and beyond.

A further factor that bodes well for the development of Rwanda's banking industry—and, by extension, the country's private sector as a whole—was the approval of Kenya Commercial Bank's (KCB) application for a licence in the country. KCB had already opened branches in Tanzania, Uganda and southern Sudan. Rwanda's decision to grant market entry to the bank was interpreted as a positive development, which would help to intensify local competition and improve services for local entrepreneurs.

### MINING

Cassiterite (a tin-bearing ore) is Rwanda's principal mineral resource (exports of tin ore and concentrates were valued at 320m. Rwanda francs in 1991), followed by wolframite (a tungsten-bearing ore) and small, known quantities of beryl, columbo-tantalite (coltan) and gold. While tin concentrates (about 1,500 metric tons) were the third-largest export earner in 1985, high transport costs and the sharp decline in international tin prices resulted in the sector becoming virtually inactive in the late 1980s. At the end of 1985 Géomines, the Belgian company with a 51% shareholding in the Rwandan mining company SOMIRWA, went into liquidation; SOMIRWA itself was declared insolvent a few months later. In 1996 the Government announced its decision to privatize the company.

The IMF estimated that Rwanda's exports of gold and diamonds amounted to US \$30m. for the first half of 1998, confirming (particularly in view of the fact that Rwanda has no diamond mines) suspicions that these minerals were originating from the DRC. Belgian statistics for 1998 indicated a dramatic rise in gold imports from Rwanda, from an annual average of \$15m. during 1990–93 to \$35m. in 1997, the first year of Rwanda's military presence in the eastern part of the DRC. In early 1997 a Belgian company established in Burundi initiated talks with the Rwandan Government in order to open a gold-refining plant in Kigali, which would process imports from the DRC.

On 12 April 2001 a UN panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of the DRC's natural resources recommended that the UN Security Council impose an embargo against all Rwandan mineral exports. The report alleged that much of Rwanda's exported coltan, cassiterite, gold and diamonds included Congolese products, which were exploited and exported in illicit circumstances. The panel adopted this conclusion by comparing Rwandan official statistics for 1995 and 2000, which demonstrated a dramatic rise in gold exports, from 1 kg to 10 kg, in cassiterite exports, from 247 metric tons to 437 tons, and in coltan exports, from 54 tons to 87 tons. The UN report also found it suspicious that Rwanda exported up to 30,491 carats of diamonds in 2000. Furthermore, the report claimed to have obtained information that the Rwandan army had organized the shipment of coltan and cassiterite from the Sominki mine in the DRC's Sud-Kivu region to Kigali in November 1998. It was also alleged that many companies involved in the exploitation of the DRC's minerals in the territories under the control of the Rwandan army were owned by close associates of President Kagame. The Rwandan armed forces were reported to have participated directly in the illicit trade in minerals. By the time the report was published, the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR) had shares in some of these companies and also benefited from receipts from the Rwandan-supported Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) rebels. Other revenue was reportedly generated by taxes collected by the APR's 'Congo desk', which had a department of mineral resources, and from payments by individuals in companies in exchange for the protection of their trade and mining activities in the DRC. The conclusions of this report were rejected both by the Rwandan Government and by the Congolese rebels, which emphasized that neither

the exploitation nor the export of these minerals was illegal, on the grounds that the Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries (CEPGL), of which the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi are members, allowed the transit of goods between its member states. It was claimed that the exports were not illicit, since export taxes were paid, accordingly, to the Congolese administration of these territories, namely the RCD, which had obtained recognition by the international community as one of the signatories of the 1999 Lusaka peace agreement. The figures released by the UN panels of experts diverged from those of the Banque Nationale du Rwanda, which reported 365 tons of cassiterite exports in 2000 (compared with 308 tons in 1999), 603 tons of coltan exports (330 tons in 1999) and 144 tons of wolfram exports (84 tons in 1999). According to the central bank, these export figures matched domestic production statistics, which would indicate that the entire output was exported in that year.

The increase in the volume of mineral exports and the increase in the coltan price, from US \$14.00 per kg in 1999 to \$18.80 per kg in 2000, contributed to a significant increase in export earnings of minerals, from \$4.6m. in 1999 to \$11.3m. in 2000. As a result, the share of minerals exports increased from 9.5% to 18.2% of the total. In 2001, owing to a 10-fold increase in coltan prices during the first half of the year, total mineral exports accounted for \$40m., a four-fold rise compared with 2000. With new mines commencing production in both Australia and Brazil, however, the international price of coltan began to decline dramatically by the end of 2001. At that time the Rwandan Minister of Finance and Economic Planning emphasized to the international press that the coltan that was exported by Rwanda during 2001 was mined in western parts of the country, where geological properties were similar to those of eastern DRC. As expected, export revenue from coltan decreased sharply, by 62.5%, from 17,368m. Rwanda francs in 2001 to 6,521m. Rwanda francs in 2002, although the volume of coltan exports declined by only 30% during that year, from 1,488 tons to 1,042 tons. Meanwhile, cassiterite exports increased from 553 tons to 690 tons, and wolfram exports nearly doubled, from 163 tons in 2001 to 324 tons in 2002.

During 2002 mineral exports amounted to 7,440m. Rwanda francs, representing 24% of the value of total exports. In 2003 mineral exports totalled 6,307m. Rwanda francs, accounting for 18.8% of the value of total exports, as a result of lower coltan prices and lower volumes of exports. During that period coltan sales amounted to 732 metric tons, worth 3,403m. Rwanda francs. Cassiterite exports totalled 1,457 tons, valued at 2,444m. Rwanda francs, while wolfram exports amounted to 120 tons, valued at 120m. Rwanda francs. Gold exports generated 245m. Rwanda francs during this period. Rwanda's Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning projected a 54.6% increase of the activity of the mining and quarrying sector for 2004. During that year the Rwandan Government was also seeking financial support from the African Development Bank (AfDB) to finance a prospecting programme, in order to identify new reserves and thereby to compensate for the progressive exhaustion of existing small deposits.

### Natural Gas

Another important mineral to be exploited is natural gas, which was discovered beneath Lake Kivu on the border with the DRC. Reserves of an estimated 60,000m. cu m (about one-half of which are in the DRC) are believed to be among the largest in the world. In May 2000 Rwanda's water, electricity and gas parastatal, Electrogaz, initiated talks with the South African company Mossgas to discuss the possibility of exploiting the Lake Kivu methane and gas resources. Two pilot installations, funded by the EU, produce gas, but here again the small size of the potential market casts doubt on the likely profitability of large-scale processing. However, Electrogaz hopes to receive Belgian funding for a programme to increase its daily output of gas from 5,000 cu m to 25,000 cu m. In October 1997 the Governments of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC agreed to finance a joint feasibility study to exploit the gas reserves of Lake Kivu. In September 1999 the Banque Rwandaise de Développement announced plans to submit a project for the establishment of a further pilot installation to process the Lake Kivu gas resources to the European Investment Bank

(EIB), the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the International Finance Corporation and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA). In July 2002 the Israel Electric Corporation negotiated a 'build-own-operate' contract with the Rwandan authorities for the construction of a 25-MW methane power station. The overall electricity generation potential from natural gas resources was estimated at 200 MW by a private consultant and at 700 MW by the Rwandan Government. Speculation regarding the potential of Lake Kivu's resources to augment Rwanda's electricity supply culminated in 2006 when the British firm Dane Associates entered into a £48m. partnership with the Rwandan Government. A 30-MW power plant was expected to result, which would tap the lake's renewable methane deposit. Plans to supply natural gas to the cement and other industries were also under consideration. In February 1999 the South African oil company Engen purchased the local subsidiaries of British Petroleum and Fina (Belgium), taking control of 25% of the distribution market for petroleum products in Rwanda. In August of that year Shell Oil acquired for US \$2.1m. the Petrorwanda distribution company.

In 2004 the World Bank was also planning to finance consultant support for the Unité de Promotion et d'Exploitation du Gaz du Lac Kivu (UPEGAZ) parastatal, considering that the medium-term development of the power sector was 'inextricably linked' to the exploitation of Lake Kivu's methane reserves. According to Bank sources, a Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment of Power Development Options for Rwanda, Burundi and western Tanzania concluded that power generation from Kivu gas was competitive with comparable hydroelectricity options. Meanwhile, the World Bank was also considering financing the construction of a transmission link to connect potential new generation at Lake Kivu. Recent developments in the sector have included demonstrations of this methane extraction technology to the Government and potential investors by engineers from a South African firm, Murray & Roberts, at a pilot plant near Gisenyi. Cogelgaz, a joint venture between BRALIRWA and the Banque de Commerce, de Développement et d'Industrie, had commissioned the South African company to undertake the technical improvement of its existing gas plant. Rwandan projects planned by Murray & Roberts included the supply of methane gas to urban areas.

In June 2008 Minister of State at the Ministry of Infrastructure, in charge of Energy, Albert Butare, stated that the Government was poised to launch a 5-MW pilot project from the methane gas reserves. He added that the Government was in talks with a US investor for a 100-MW project, and claimed that the potential power generation from Lake Kivu stood at 350 MW.

### ENERGY

Rwanda has long suffered power shortages. In 2007 the country generated 165.4 GWh of electricity, but total demand stood at 248.7 GWh, according to government statistics. Only 5% of the country's population was connected to electricity in 2007, compared with a government target of 34% of the population by 2020. Fossil fuels accounted for just over one-half (54%) of electricity generation, while the remaining 46% was accounted for by hydroelectric power.

Rwanda planned to build a hydropower plant on the River Nyabarongo from 2008, and requested a modification of its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) with the IMF to accommodate construction of the project. The total cost of the project was to be US \$112.7m., or approximately 3% of GDP, and it was to be built over a period of four years. The IMF expressed misgivings after the authorities failed to secure borrowing on concessional terms (i.e. below non market rates) for one-half of the project, but the Rwandan Government expressed its determination to press ahead with construction, which it regarded as crucial to the country's future development. To help finance construction, the Government secured \$80m. in funding, including a grant from Exim Bank of India.

Rwanda's electricity needs are supplied almost entirely from hydroelectric sources, as the land relief is ideal for power generation. According to studies undertaken by the CEPGL's *Énergie des Pays des Grands Lacs*, the Ruzizi river alone offers

potential generating capacity totalling 500 MW, of which only a fraction is currently being used.

In accordance with its objective to transform the country into a centre of services and a low cost centre of production for the region, which requires regular power supply as a pre-condition, the Rwandan Government declared 2004 to be 'the year of energy'. The first priority established by Lahmeyer International, which took over the management of Electrogaz by the end of 2003, was to reduce technical losses in the transport and distribution of power. A second objective was to improve Electrogaz's performance, and thus create a favourable context for privatization. By early 2004 the AfDB, the World Bank and the OPEC Fund for International Development were considering investing US \$50m. in order to support the Government's energy and water programmes. Electrogaz was also seeking complementary funds in order to improve the distribution networks in Kigali and other urban areas. The state-owned company was also planning to provide Kigali with a strategic reserve of 5 MW of thermal origin. By early 2004 2-MW generators were already being rehabilitated, and Electrogaz was considering the acquisition of generators in order to enable the Gatsata diesel station near Kigali to produce the remaining 3 MW. Power cuts resulting from increased demand were becoming more frequent by the end of 2003. After the completion of its rehabilitation, Electrogaz was considering several options to expand its capacity. The most advanced is the project to convert into electricity the methane of Lake Kivu. Electrogaz was trying to interest local companies, which were seeking larger and more secure power supplies, in joint ventures for the construction of small pilot plants with a maximum capacity of 2 MW. Meanwhile, the Government was continuing talks with an Israeli-Norwegian independent power producer, Dane Associates, to develop a 200-MW gas-powered plant. In a first phase, an extraction unit with a 20-MW–30-MW capacity, split into four units, in order to be compatible with existent installations, was to be established. Electrogaz also planned to restore the capacity of existing hydro-power infrastructures, such as the Ruzizi 1 plant (10 MW), in the neighbouring DRC. In late 2003 the Rwandan company dispatched a team of experts, which estimated the cost of such rehabilitation work at \$1.5m. Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda expressed interest in January 2004 in the development of the Rusumo Falls hydro-power project on the Kagera river, generating capacity of which was estimated at 65–70 MW, at a ministerial meeting held in Kigali, in the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative.

Insufficient rainfall in 2004 aggravated Rwanda's chronic electricity shortfall: Electrogaz's supplies declined by 20%. As an emergency response, in June the Government provided finance for the purchase of 12.5 MW of new diesel generation capacity from Global Power System (Belgium/Germany), for the Jabana substation in Kigali (7.8 MW) and for the 4.7-MW extension of the Gatsata power station, at a total cost of €4.3m. In addition, the Government planned to add a 10–15-MW thermal capacity by 2006–07 in order to meet demand. The Rwandan authorities and Electrogaz came to the conclusion that reform was necessary to help the company reduce structural deficits. Electrogaz, which was obliged to purchase large quantities of fuel and to fund its investment programme, was already burdened by its debts and World Bank experts considered that major financial restructuring was required in order to limit electricity price shocks to the economy. It was none the less estimated that in order to cover its operational costs and other expenditures, Electrogaz should increase its tariffs from 42 Rwanda francs per kWh to 131 Rwanda francs per kWh. However, the 2005 budget envisaged increasing the tariff to only 61 Rwanda francs per kWh. Long-term solutions to the problem included the revitalization of regional co-operation in the energy sector. A step in that direction was made in July 2004, when the foreign ministers of Burundi, DRC and Rwanda, meeting in Brussels, Belgium, announced their commitment to reviving the activities of the CEPGL, and, more specially, the rehabilitation of the Ruzizi 1 hydroelectric power station, of which current capacity of 28.2 MW was to be upgraded to 39.6 MW, thereby enabling Ruzizi 1 to sell electricity to Electrogaz. The upgrading of the Ruzizi 2 power station was also envisaged. The main customer of the combined Ruzizi 1/Ruzizi 2 capacity is Rwanda, which took 68% of the

187 GWh produced in 2002, followed by the DRC (31%) and Burundi (1%). In the long term, projects may include the construction of Ruzizi 3. The total potential of the river is estimated at some 200 MW, which, if harnessed, would satisfy the needs of the CEPGL members and provide the potential to export to other countries in the region. In order to be realized, however, these projects require, on the one hand, the improvement of bilateral relations between Rwanda and the DRC and, on the other, the settlement of the debt owed by Electrogaz to SNEL, which was estimated at US \$330,000 in July 2004. Another pre-condition for the revival of CEPGL co-operation was the restructuring of the Banque de Développement des Etats des Grands Lacs (BDEGL), which formerly arranged financing with the EIB, Italy and the World Bank for the \$72m. Ruzizi 2 station. Such reform is necessary if the BDEGL is to fulfil its ambitions to become the vehicle for the implementation of NEPAD projects in the region, including the interconnection between Kigoma (Rwanda) and Rwegura (Burundi), and the interconnection of the CEPGL and Tanzanian grids.

Donors also considered that the Société Commerciale et Industrielle du Gaz (SOCIGAZ), which was created in 1990 by the DRC and Rwanda to develop methane gas projects, was also badly in need of financial and technical support if it was to increase its activities. Some progress, however, was achieved in the projects to develop the Lake Kivu methane reserves for use in energy generation projects. In late 2004 the World Bank was planning to finance consultant support to UPEGAZ (see above). In March 2005 Dane Associates signed an agreement with the Government of Rwanda for a 49-year concession to extract methane gas from the central Kibuye section of Lake Kivu, to be used to generate electricity to be sold to Electrogaz. The two companies established a joint venture called Kibuye Power 1 to manage the operation, which was to require an estimated total investment of US \$60m. Meanwhile, in February Cogelgas commenced negotiations for a power purchase agreement with the Government, and it was additionally looking for an operator for the development of its Gisenyi methane gas concession.

## TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Internal communications in Rwanda are operated almost exclusively along the relatively well-developed road system (14,008 km in 2004), as there are no railways nor navigable waterways (except Lake Kivu). Asphalted highways link Rwanda with Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and Tanzania. They also connect the principal towns. Tarmac roads extend to just over 1,000 km, which, given the small size of the country, is one of the highest densities in Africa. In early 1999 works financed by IDA for the asphalted of the 91-km Gitarama–Kibuye road were completed. Moreover, the World Bank agreed to disburse an additional US \$10m. by the end of 1998 for the construction of roads to connect the nearby villages to the Gitarama–Kibuye road in order to facilitate the transporting of crops.

Rwanda's external trade is heavily dependent on the ports of Mombasa (Kenya), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Matadi (DRC), and about 80% of Rwandan exports and imports pass through Uganda and Kenya. Insecurity caused by the war in the north of Rwanda led to the closure of the northern transport 'corridor' through Uganda. With the Gatuna and Kagitumba roads unavailable, most traffic had to be diverted via the difficult and unreliable route through Tanzania. In 1992 several projects had been approved by the EU and the World Bank to improve road links between eastern Zaire and western Uganda, with the aim of facilitating the passage of Rwandan trade across the border with Zaire, and thereby bypassing the troubled border with Uganda. By the end of 1997 the EU had committed a total of ECU 34.5m. to rehabilitate 200 km of roads and the national airport of Kanombe and work on the project was under way. In October 2000 the EU agreed to allocate €9.2m. towards the completion of the rehabilitation of the 111-km road between Gitarama and the Burundi border. The OPEC Fund for International Development signed a further \$10m. loan agreement with Rwanda to co-finance upgrading of the Gitarama road in early 2005. Further measures to improve the road network were undertaken in 2005. In July public

works companies were invited to bid for the construction of the Kicukiro–Nyamata–Nemba road, to be financed by AfDB, and for the rehabilitation of tarmac roads in Kigali, financed by BADEA. In mid-2007 the World Bank reportedly agreed to disburse a grant of some US \$11m. to facilitate the construction of roads in the northern provinces and to reconstruct the 83-km road connecting Kigali with Gisenyi in the DRC. The rehabilitation of these sections of road comprised part of the Government's Transport Sector Development Project, which had received an additional grant from the African Growth Catalyst fund valued at some \$38m. earlier in the year.

Feasibility studies have been conducted for a railway network to link Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. The Rwandan business community showed renewed interest in the sector in early 2000, dispatching a delegation to the railway terminal of Isaka (Tanzania) to discuss with the local authorities and the Tanzania Railway Corporation plans to make greater use of this central corridor, combining a road link from Kigali to Isaka (500 km) and the railway line from Isaka to the port of Dar es Salaam (1,300 km). In April 2000 Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania expressed their renewed intention to seek funds to build the railway link between Isaka and Kigali with a possible extension to Burundi. Nearly eight years later, in January 2008, Tanzania announced that it expected work to begin on the link from Isaka to Kigali before the end of the year. Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a US company, had been chosen to act as advisers to the Rwandan Government over construction. The office of Tanzania's President Jakaya Kikwete stated that the work was envisaged to be completed by 2013.

Two foreign airlines, Belgium's Brussels Airlines and Italy's Meridiana, were selected to bid for a 40% stake in Rwanda's national carrier, Rwandair Express, in June 2007. In that year Rwandair, the country's only airline, offered services to Kenya, Uganda and Burundi on a daily basis, while also flying to Tanzania and South Africa three times a week. However, the winning bidder had still not been selected by mid-2008.

In 1998 the Government announced it would adopt a regulatory framework to supervise the participation of private companies in the telecommunications sector and to finalize the privatization of Rwandatel. In late 1999 the Government announced that the privatization of the national telecommunications company would take place during 2000. Meanwhile, the private mobile cellular telephone corporation MTN Rwandacell announced the extension of its Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) network, which would henceforth cover three-quarters of Rwanda's territory. Rwandatel's growth is probably the country's greatest commercial success since independence. When it was created in 1993 only 3,000 lines were operating. One year later that figure had increased to 12,000, but the disruption during the 1994 genocide resulted in the near collapse of the system. By 2001 the network had expanded to 20,000 lines. By mid-2002 the country had three internet service providers (Rwandatel, the National University of Rwanda and the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology). Rwandatel's plan was to introduce high-speed and high-capacity asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) connections during 2002, in order to improve services to the private sector and national institutions. Development plans included the construction of new centres, with a capacity of 20,000 lines, to provide telephone services to the inhabitants of the outskirts of Kigali, and to replace old cables outside the capital with fibre-optic ones. The long-planned privatization of the company remained the objective, but the Government took the decision to continue the expansion of the company and, after its capital reached significant proportions, to sell 51% of shares to a private operator. Plans also included the sale of Rwandatel's 26% share in Rwandacell and the creation of the government-owned company's own mobile telephone subsidiary. At the beginning of 2002 the company expanded its activities in the neighbouring DRC, signing a partnership agreement with the management of the parastatal Office Congolais des Postes et des Télécommunications in the part of the country held by the Rwandan-backed RCD, in order to improve telecommunications in both Goma and Bukavu.

The development of telecommunications was part of the national information technology policy. The Government

established an Information Technology Commission, headed by the President, in 2001, and created an agency to oversee a five-year plan, with a projected cost of US \$500m., to develop the sector, with the assistance of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The mobile cellular telephone sector expanded even more rapidly. By early 2003 it was estimated that the number of mobile cellular telephones in use in the country was at least double that of fixed telephone lines. In early 2004, however, demand for telecommunication services still exceeded the capacity of the operators, as a result of lack of financing and competition in services provision. It was anticipated that the privatization of Rwandatel would improve its operational and financial performance, as well as its investment capacity. The Government was also considering the sale of its shares in Rwandacell, the market-leader (well ahead of Afritel and Artel, which operate mainly in rural areas). In early 2004 more than 300 secondary schools were provided with internet connectivity. In February 2005 President Kagame stated, at the African Information Communications Technologies conference in Accra, Ghana, that all of the country's secondary schools were to be connected to the internet by 2017. Kagame also announced that broadband infrastructure was in place in Rwanda, that there was fibre-optic infrastructure in Kigali and most other towns and that the authorities planned to extend this to other areas of the country. Rwanda, like other East and Central African countries, relies on satellite as a sole medium for international connectivity. However, the Government has, through Rwandatel, subscribed to the future East African Submarine Cable System. The number of internet centres was increasing rapidly in the country. In early 2005, for example, farmers at Maraba were using such facilities to communicate with other coffee producers from the rest of the world.

The Government announced in July 2008 that it would invest 1,500m. Rwanda francs in telecom infrastructure in rural areas in 2008. The funding came from a 2% tax on the total turnover of Rwandatel and MTN Rwandacell. A state-sponsored company, New Artel, was to use the money to invest in areas that the two main telecom operators did not reach. New Artel has a strong focus on increasing internet connectivity.

The authorities were also targeting a highly ambitious 50% penetration rate for telephone services to its population by 2010. In 2008 only 9% of the population had access to telephony. In June 2008, the authorities invited bids for a third combined 15-year fixed and mobile license. The Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA) stated that it expected strong demand for the license, given the country's young (and growing) population. RURA pledged that the new licensee would be able to exploit existing infrastructure to roll out its services.

## DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

The members of the CEPGL agreed in 1978 to form a joint development bank, and to co-operate in the development of a transport system and the construction of a hydroelectric power station (the Ruzizi 2 project) on the Rwanda–Congo border, the exploitation of methane gas deposits beneath Lake Kivu and the promotion of a fishing industry. The BDEGL was formerly established in 1980, with its headquarters at Goma, in what was then Zaire. However, it was only in July 2004 that the three CEPGL states undertook to resume co-operation within the framework of the CEPGL in the interests of promoting regional stability and economic development. Energy was given priority in the list of joint projects, more specifically the rehabilitation of the Ruzizi 1 hydroelectric power station, followed by the restructuring of the BDEGL, the exploitation of the Lake Kivu methane gas reserves, and agriculture and communications projects. However, cross-border raids by Hutu rebels into Rwanda and from the Rwandan Defence Force militia into the DRC at the end of 2004 created a climate of tension, which caused delays in the implementation of these projects.

The Rwandan Government has sought unsuccessfully to limit the overall budget deficit, which reached 16.4% of GDP in 1999. Furthermore, the high level of military expenditure (about one-third of current expenditure in 1997, despite a

demilitarization programme which commenced in that year) was a matter of concern for donors, particularly compared with the share of the social sectors, which declined from 38% to 18% between 1985 and 1995. In November 1998 the Government pledged to limit military expenditure to 4% of GDP and civil service salaries to 3.6% of GDP. In that year the Government announced plans for some 3,600 redundancies within the civil service and for the sale of up to one-half of its vehicles in an effort to reduce expenditure. The Government also announced plans to increase substantially taxes on beer, petrol, soft drinks, cigarettes, wines and spirits, in an attempt to balance the 1999 budget.

In 1999 an overall budget deficit of 25,300m. Rwanda francs (equivalent to 3.9% of GDP) was recorded. This was attributed to a decrease in earnings from exports of coffee, pyrethrum, and hides and skins, despite the good performance of the tea sector. The 2000 budget of 168,900m. Rwanda francs (including foreign funding, which amounted to 53.7% of the total) was 2,000m. Rwanda francs lower than the budget of the previous year. In order to balance the 2000 budget, the Government decided to maximize its earnings, by introducing a value-added tax on 1 July of that year and by accelerating the privatization process. Despite the concerns expressed by donors, defence still remained a priority of the national budget in 2000, absorbing 19.8% of total expenditure. However, the Government confirmed its decision to make 3,600 redundancies and to suspend new recruitment of civil servants. In April 2000 the new Prime Minister, Bernard Makuza, expressed the Government's commitment to curb corruption, following the resignation of his predecessor and parliamentary investigations into embezzlement charges concerning several ministers of the previous administration. An overall budget deficit of 40,200m. Rwanda francs (equivalent to 5.5% of GDP) was recorded in 2001.

In May 2001 the Rwandan Government presented a 'plan of action' for the 2001–10 period at the third UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, which took place in Brussels. The principal aims were to achieve an average annual GDP growth rate of at least 6%, restrain inflation to below 5% a year, reduce the current-account deficit (excluding official transfers) from 16.8% of GDP in 2000 to 10.7% in 2004, maintain the level of gross official reserves at a level of at least the value of six months of imports, increase the ratio of revenue to GDP by one-half of a percentage point per year, and maintain debt at sustainable levels. In order to meet those targets, the challenge was to diversify the economy, and to increase labour productivity and rural recapitalization in all sectors. To that effect, the 'plan of action' included in its strategy the creation of training opportunities for unskilled young workers and the provision of rural credit, financial services and support to small-scale enterprises. Meanwhile, the Government would also aim to increase tax collection, from 9.7% of GDP at the end of 1999 to 11% by the end of 2001. Positive results were also expected from the elimination of tariffs on regional trade consistent with the Cross-Border Initiative.

In early 2002 the Government announced its objective to increase GDP per head to US \$960 by 2020, as part of the objectives of the 'Vision 2020' development strategy. Emphasis was to be placed on the development of services, which accounted for 34.4% of the country's GDP in 2001. The ambition was to transform Rwanda from an essentially agrarian economy to a knowledge-based society within 20 years, through the development of information technology. To this effect, the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology was inaugurated in July 2002. Meanwhile, efforts were being devoted to integrating the Rwandan banking system further into the global economy, as was demonstrated by the establishment, in April of the same year, by six Rwandan banks of a joint company to promote the use of credit cards and other electronic payment systems. The Government also aimed to encourage development in the tourism sector, which was undergoing a recovery, although its contribution to tertiary sector GDP had not reached pre-war levels by the end of 2001. However, by the end of 2003 the contribution of services to GDP had risen to 36.3%. The 'Vision 2020' strategy also aimed to increase the literacy rate from 48% in 2000 to 100%. The long-term objective was to transform Rwanda into a regional centre for services, not least within the framework of a revived CEPGL. The

expansion of the coffee and tea industries, of tourism and of new communication technologies were set as priorities of the 2004 budget. Indeed, Rwanda is endowed with considerable tourism attractions, including its volcanoes and wildlife resources such as mountain gorillas and the zebras of the Kagera National Park. South Africa's Sun Group, which acquired the Meridien Hotel in Gisenyi, together with Kenyan investors and also Rwandan private interests, has contributed significantly to the development of Rwanda's hotel capacity. The first phase of the Kigali Amusement Park (KAP) was due to open in mid-2007, but it was later announced that the project would be delayed by up to five years. The KAP project was conceived by local entrepreneurs and was to be partially funded by the Commercial Bank of Rwanda. A casino, botanical garden, and 15 'eco-tourist' bungalows would feature in the completed park, in addition to a series of rides to be designed by the Chinese firm SBL Co. Adding to investment momentum in Rwanda's tourism industry, the Government announced in December 2007 that holding company Dubai World was poised to invest a total of \$230m. in four separate projects in Rwanda over three years. The company planned to build a five-star golf resort (together with 300 luxury apartments) in the capital Kigali, together with three four-star hotels in three other key locations, including Nyungwe Forest (in the south-west of the country), Volcanoes National Park (in the north-west) and Akagera Park (in the east).

Of the 375,800m. Rwanda francs budget for 2005 (of which as much as 57.7% was to be foreign-financed) 27.9% was allocated to development expenditure. Health, education, defence and infrastructure accounted for most of the 9% increase in total budget spending. Some 4,000m. Rwanda francs was designated for the road fund, but total requirements for rehabilitation of the network were estimated at 12,000m. Rwanda francs. Other priorities of the budget were the need to enhance agricultural productivity and improve distribution of seeds and fertilizers, to promote better access to loans for the agricultural sector and to finance land reforms, as well as investments in information technologies. The 2006 budget increased to an estimated 399,300m. Rwanda francs, 49.8% of which was domestically financed. There has been a general trend in increasing government expenditure, which represented 28.2% of GDP in 2005. While the budget outlay increased in 2006, an improved economic performance saw expenditure decrease as a percentage of GDP (26.2%). The 2007 budget forecast expenditure of 506,700m. Rwanda francs, which included significant allocations to the agricultural and tourism sectors. Key service sectors were also scheduled to receive substantial budgetary funding, among which included the Kigali Water Project (3,300m. Rwanda francs) and the Common Development Fund which received a bursary of 5,000m. Rwanda francs. The introduction of a 3% excise tax on a number of goods and services was expected to yield additional domestic revenue; however, around 53.3% of the budget was still expected to be financed externally, mostly in the form of grants.

Meanwhile, despite criticisms of Rwanda's involvement in the DRC war, donors continued to provide economic and financial support to Rwanda. In March 2000 the European Commission announced that it would allocate €110m. to Rwanda under the country's national indicative programme of the Fourth Lomé Convention. The remaining €47m. would be disbursed according to the use of the first tranche. Three-quarters of the funding under the programme was allocated to poverty alleviation projects, with the remainder being allocated to projects aimed at promoting good governance and justice. Meanwhile, the World Bank announced that it would provide assistance during 2000 through two projects, one in agriculture and one in rural water, with a total value of US \$25m. The World Bank was planning to disburse an additional amount of \$125m. for four projects in 2001: one in agriculture; one in human resources development; one in trade and private sector development; and a leveraged insurance facility for trade, a regional facility to guarantee investment against sovereign, but not exchange-rate, risk. In addition, in early 2000 the People's Republic of China announced a grant of 20m. yuan (approximately \$2.5m.) for agriculture, road construction and education projects. In 2000 USAID assistance

totalled \$34.7m., supporting Economic Support Funds from the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, Development Assistance and emergency International Development Assistance from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In 2002 USAID planned to support the three priority areas: development relief and conflict prevention; global health; and economic growth. USAID also announced its intention to increase its efforts to counter HIV/AIDS by expanding awareness activities, working with other donors to prevent mother-to-child transmission and providing counselling and other support to infected persons. In that year USAID was in the early stages of implementing a three-year, multifaceted effort to stimulate agricultural production and promote broad-based economic growth, complemented by a substantial development-orientated Food for Peace programme. Components of the programme included human resources development at the principal agricultural research, training and educational institutions, policy advice to the then Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Forestry, and the expansion of agribusiness and export opportunities. In 2000 Rwanda was the main recipient of Belgian development aid on the African continent, with a loan totalling 412.5m. Belgian francs.

In January 2001 Rwanda, declared eligible to benefit from the IMF- and World Bank-sponsored initiative for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) in December 2000, obtained debt relief of US \$810m., which was to contribute substantially to the alleviation of the country's debt burden. Total outstanding external debt was estimated at \$1,324m. by the end of 2000, equivalent to 73% of GDP. More than 87% of Rwandan external debt was owed to multilateral partners, principally the World Bank Group, with \$998.4m., followed by the AfDB (\$208.4m.). The main bilateral creditors were France (\$35.2m.), the People's Republic of China (\$32.2m.), Saudi Arabia (\$29.8m.), Kuwait (\$29.4m.) and Japan (\$13.6m.). The Government estimated that annual cash flow savings from this relief would be about \$20m.–\$30m. per year, equivalent to 1.5% of GDP, in 2001–10. In April 2001 Rwanda also completed an interim Poverty Strategy Reduction Paper, which was to serve as the basis for both concessional lending and debt relief under the enhanced HIPC initiative. The debt relief was expected to benefit the health, education, agriculture and infrastructure sectors.

The World Bank intensified its financial support to Rwanda in 2001, with the adoption of a US \$48m. programme to revitalize the rural economy, increase rural income and reduce poverty. The project, which was financed by a credit from IDA, was to focus on the rehabilitation of farmed marshland and hillside areas, the promotion of commercial and export-orientated agriculture, support for agricultural services delivery systems, small-scale rural infrastructure development and the encouragement of off-farm productive activities. By 2005 however, only a very small amount of money in this large project had actually been spent, due to inertia at the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture and negligence at the World Bank. The appointment of a new Minister of Agriculture and new World Bank staff in 2005 and 2006 was expected to bring about improvements. This project was part of a \$165m. rural development programme, launched in December 2001, which was to be 95% financed by the World Bank. This larger programme, which was to be implemented over a 14-year period, involved the construction of infrastructure and research centres, with the aim of finding new commercial outlets for Rwanda's agricultural products.

In March 2002 the AfDB, which approved a US \$30m. loan in 2001, opened a permanent office in Kigali in order to intensify its co-operation with Rwanda. In January 2001 President Kagame emphasized the Rwandan Government's achievements since 1994: state revenue, negligible in 1994, reached 70,000m. Rwanda francs in 2000, while the number of Rwandan university students had increased from 3,000 to 7,000 during the same period, and 355 hospitals and health centres were rehabilitated. However, Kagame deplored Rwanda's high levels of infant mortality, low life-expectancy, which was still below 50 years, and the Rwandan population's low purchasing power. By mid-2006 health indicators remained a cause for concern. Women and children were suffering disproportionately as a result of high fertility rates, a low proportion of

births attended by qualified personnel, poor nutrition and high mortality rates. HIV/AIDS remained a serious problem, with prevalence rates estimated by UNAIDS at 3.1% of persons aged 15–49 years in 2005. In that year, however, important progress was made in re-establishing health systems. The expansion in health care expenditure initiated in 2003 was consolidated, with recurrent health expenditure reaching almost 1%. Progress made in the education sector in previous years was consolidated during 2004, with important policy reforms implemented. The introduction of fee-free education led to a further improvement in primary enrolment.

In February 2008 the IMF authorized disbursement of US \$1.8m. from the country's \$12.7m. PRGF, taking total loans under the three-year programme to \$7.2m. In May 2008 the release of full details of the fourth review of the PRGF pointed to continued uninterrupted multilateral support. This review stated that a planned large-scale energy project should have a 'manageable' impact on debt sustainability, while helping to alleviate 'binding infrastructure bottlenecks'. This followed a positive evaluation of the project's viability by the World Bank.

Rwanda's President Paul Kagame and US President George Bush signed a bilateral investment treaty in February 2008. The treaty's details included the free transfer of investment-related funds, non-discriminatory treatment for companies working in one another's countries and provisions for compensation in the event of expropriation. Trade flows between the two countries increased during 2007, with Rwanda's exports to the US increasing by 43% year-on-year to US \$13m. and Rwanda's imports from the US increasing by 37% year-on-year to \$16m.

## FOREIGN TRADE

Like many emerging markets, Rwanda has maintained a trade deficit, as it imports significant volumes of capital goods to help develop its economy. In 2007 the deficit amounted to US \$404m., up from \$299m. in 2006 and \$228m. in 2005, according to the IMF. Exports amounted to \$177m. in 2007, compared to an import bill of \$581m. However, the IMF was not overly concerned by this upward trajectory. Following the most recent review of the country's PRGF, the IMF had estimated an increase in the deficit to \$548m. in 2008, before projecting further (albeit smaller) increases in the deficit in 2009 and 2010.

Rwanda's trade deficit was manageable because of significant donor support and foreign direct investment (FDI), which totalled US \$82m. in 2007, compared with a programmed level of \$40m. and \$31m. in 2006. High levels of foreign donor support and increasing FDI ensured that the capital account remained in surplus, thereby funding the country's trade deficits.

In 2003 exports declined by 6.0%, to US \$63m., as a result of lower coffee and mineral export revenues. Coffee accounted for 27.6% of total exports, with \$13.9m., ahead of tea (\$11.9m., 23.6%). Coltan and other mineral products followed, ahead of re-exports, hides and manufacturing products. In 2003 imports amounted to \$229m., compared with \$233m. in the previous year. As a result, there was little movement in the trade deficit, which was recorded at \$166m. In 2003 the main destinations of exports were Kenya (40.9%), followed by Uganda (26.6%) and the United Kingdom (6.2%), according to UN statistics. The main origins of imports in that year were Kenya (28.4%), followed by Belgium (12.2%), Uganda (7.7%), the United Arab Emirates (7.6%), Tanzania (5.6%) and South Africa (4.9%). In 2004 coffee was the leading export product, generating \$27.5m. of export revenue, followed by tea (\$25.6m.), cassiterite (\$12.9m.) and coltan (\$10.6m.). At the beginning of 2004, in view of Rwanda's low underlying growth rate, the Government began to examine export promotion and broader trade issues. An export promotion strategy was adopted in the second half of the year, and a reformed Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency was launched. Export performance in 2004 was promising, reversing previous negative trends. Exports increased in value by 51.4% to \$98m., largely driven by coffee, cassiterite and coltan. In terms of imports, poor domestic food production and the energy crisis led to

higher food and fuel imports. However, this was partly offset by lower imports of industrial goods as a result of the energy crisis and the additional competition caused by entry into the COMESA Free Trade Area. In total, imports increased by 18.9% to \$276m., more than offsetting the improved export performance. As a result, the current-account deficit on the balance of payments (excluding official transfers) deteriorated marginally from 16.6% of GDP to 16.8%. Imports increased by a further 28.6% in 2005, reaching \$355m. An accompanying rise in the value of exports, which increased to \$128m., failed to improve the trade deficit which was reported at \$227m. that year, compared with \$178m. in 2004. A rise in transfer receipts, meanwhile, narrowed the current account deficit considerably, which stood at \$84m. in 2005.

In March 2004 negotiations commenced between the EU and the Eastern and Southern Africa group of countries (including Rwanda) for a World Trade Organization compatible free trade

Economic Partnership Agreement, due to enter force in 2008. With the extension, until 2007, of AGOA, enacted by the USA to extend duty-free and quota-free access to the US market for nearly all textile and handicraft goods produced in eligible beneficiary countries, the Rwandan Government was keen to benefit further from this system. In the mid-2000s Rwandan small-scale cloth and textile handicraft businesses were beginning to export products to the USA.

In July 2007 Rwanda (with Burundi) formally became a member of the East African Community (EAC), an intergovernmental body that already comprised Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, and which was designed to promote regional integration and trade. A customs union was established by the EAC in 2005, although by mid-2008 Rwanda was yet to become a member. Rwanda has long maintained high import tariffs on certain goods, in order to generate revenues and suppress the trade deficit.

## Statistical Survey

Source (unless otherwise stated): Office rwandais d'information, BP 83, Kigali; tel. 75724.

### Area and Population

#### AREA, POPULATION AND DENSITY

|                                       |            |
|---------------------------------------|------------|
| Area (sq km)                          | 26,338*    |
| Population (census results)           |            |
| 15 August 1991                        | 7,142,755  |
| 16 August 2002†                       |            |
| Males                                 | 3,879,448  |
| Females                               | 4,249,105  |
| Total                                 | 8,128,553  |
| Population (UN estimate at mid-year)‡ |            |
| 2006                                  | 9,464,000  |
| 2007                                  | 9,725,000  |
| 2008                                  | 10,009,000 |
| Density (per sq km) at mid-2008       | 380.0      |

\* 10,169 sq miles.

† Provisional results.

‡ Source: UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision*.

#### PREFECTURES

(1991 census)

|              | Area (sq km)  | Population*      | Density (per sq km) |
|--------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Butare       | 1,830         | 765,910          | 418.5               |
| Byumba       | 4,987         | 779,365          | 159.2               |
| Cyangugu     | 2,226         | 517,550          | 232.5               |
| Gikongoro    | 2,192         | 462,635          | 211.1               |
| Gisenyi      | 2,395         | 728,365          | 304.1               |
| Gitarama     | 2,241         | 849,285          | 379.0               |
| Kibungo      | 4,134         | 647,175          | 156.5               |
| Kibuye       | 1,320         | 472,525          | 358.0               |
| Kigali       | 3,251         | 921,050          | 355.2               |
| Kigali-Ville |               | 233,640          |                     |
| Ruhengeri    | 1,762         | 765,255          | 434.3               |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>26,338</b> | <b>7,142,755</b> | <b>271.2</b>        |

\* Source: UN, *Demographic Yearbook*.

#### PRINCIPAL TOWNS

(population at 1978 census)

|                  |         |           |        |
|------------------|---------|-----------|--------|
| Kigali (capital) | 117,749 | Ruhengeri | 16,025 |
| Butare           | 21,691  | Gisenyi   | 12,436 |

**Mid-2007** (incl. suburbs, UN estimate): Kigali 860,000 (Source: UN, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*).

#### BIRTHS AND DEATHS

(annual averages, UN estimates)

|                        | 1990-95 | 1995-2000 | 2000-05 |
|------------------------|---------|-----------|---------|
| Birth rate (per 1,000) | 41.7    | 40.2      | 43.9    |
| Death rate (per 1,000) | 41.9    | 24.1      | 18.4    |

Source: UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision*.

**Expectation of life** (years at birth, WHO estimates): 51.7 (males 50.7; females 52.6) in 2006 (Source: WHO, *World Health Statistics*).

#### ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION

(persons aged 14 years and over, at census of August 2002)

|                                   | Males            | Females          | Total            |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Agriculture                       | 1,218,181        | 1,731,411        | 2,949,592        |
| Fishing                           | 3,374            | 94               | 3,468            |
| Industrial activities             | 3,692            | 1,636            | 5,328            |
| Production activities             | 32,994           | 10,649           | 43,643           |
| Electricity and water             | 2,390            | 277              | 2,667            |
| Construction                      | 41,641           | 1,244            | 42,885           |
| Trade reconstruction              | 56,869           | 32,830           | 89,699           |
| Restaurants and hotels            | 4,525            | 2,311            | 6,836            |
| Transport and communications      | 29,574           | 1,988            | 31,562           |
| Financial intermediaries          | 1,560            | 840              | 2,400            |
| Administration and defence        | 22,479           | 5,585            | 28,064           |
| Education                         | 22,688           | 17,046           | 39,734           |
| Health and social services        | 7,521            | 7,054            | 14,575           |
| Activities not adequately defined | 69,042           | 39,458           | 108,500          |
| <b>Total employed</b>             | <b>1,516,530</b> | <b>1,852,423</b> | <b>3,368,953</b> |

Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix* (December 2004).

**Mid-2005** (estimates in '000): Agriculture, etc. 4,376; Total labour force 4,873 (Source: FAO).

## Health and Welfare

### KEY INDICATORS

|  |       |
|--|-------|
| Total fertility rate (children per woman, 2006)      | 6.0   |
| Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births, 2006) | 160   |
| HIV/AIDS (% of persons aged 15–49, 2005)             | 3.1   |
| Physicians (per 1,000 head, 2004)                    | 0.05  |
| Hospital beds (per 1,000 head, 2007)                 | 1.6   |
| Health expenditure (2005): US \$ per head (PPP)      | 136   |
| Health expenditure (2005): % of GDP                  | 7.2   |
| Health expenditure (2005): public (% of total)       | 56.9  |
| Access to water (% of persons, 2004)                 | 74    |
| Access to sanitation (% of persons, 2004)            | 42    |
| Human Development Index (2005): ranking              | 161   |
| Human Development Index (2005): value                | 0.452 |

For sources and definitions, see explanatory note on p. vi.

## Agriculture

### PRINCIPAL CROPS

('000 metric tons)

|                              | 2004    | 2005    | 2006    |
|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Maize                        | 88.2    | 97.3    | 91.8    |
| Sorghum                      | 163.8   | 227.9   | 187.4   |
| Potatoes                     | 1,072.8 | 1,314.1 | 128.5   |
| Sweet potatoes               | 908.3   | 885.6   | 777.0   |
| Cassava (Manioc)             | 765.7   | 781.6   | 588.2   |
| Taro (Coco yam)              | 136.4   | 136.9   | 125.4   |
| Sugar cane*                  | 70.0    | 70.0    | 70.0    |
| Dry beans                    | 198.2   | 199.6   | 283.4   |
| Dry peas                     | 16.8    | 18.9    | 14.2    |
| Groundnuts (in shell)        | 10.8    | 10.1    | 9.0     |
| Pumpkins, squash and gourds* | 210.3   | 214.4   | 214.4   |
| Plantains                    | 2,469.7 | 2,593.1 | 2,653.3 |
| Coffee (green)               | 20.0    | 18.6    | 21.0    |
| Tea (made)                   | 14.5    | 16.5    | 16.0    |

\*FAO estimates.

**Aggregate production** ('000 metric tons, may include official, semi-official or estimated data): Total cereals 319 in 2004, 413 in 2005, 366 in 2006; Total roots and tubers 2,887 in 2004, 3,122 in 2005, 2,780 in 2006; Total pulses 215 in 2004, 219 in 2005, 298 in 2006; Total vegetables (incl. melons) 267 in 2004, 271 in 2005, 271 in 2006; Total fruits (excl. melons) 2,546 in 2004, 2,670 in 2005, 2,730 in 2006.

Source: FAO.

### LIVESTOCK

('000 head, year ending September)

|          | 2003   | 2004    | 2005    |
|----------|--------|---------|---------|
| Cattle   | 991.7  | 1,003.7 | 1,004.1 |
| Pigs     | 211.9  | 326.7   | 346.9   |
| Sheep    | 371.8  | 470.0   | 464.3   |
| Goats    | 941.1  | 1,264.0 | 1,339.7 |
| Rabbits  | 498    | 520     | 519     |
| Chickens | 1,800* | 2,042   | 2,000*  |

\*FAO estimate.

**2006:** Figures assumed to be unchanged from 2005 (FAO estimates).

Source: FAO.

### LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS

('000 metric tons, FAO estimates)

|              | 2003  | 2004  | 2005  |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Cattle meat  | 23.6  | 23.0  | 23.1  |
| Goat meat    | 3.3   | 4.5   | 4.7   |
| Pig meat     | 3.9   | 6.0   | 6.4   |
| Chicken meat | 2.0   | 2.3   | 2.3   |
| Game meat    | 11.0  | 11.0  | 11.0  |
| Other meat   | 3.1   | 3.4   | 3.4   |
| Cows' milk   | 112.5 | 121.4 | 120.0 |
| Sheep's milk | 1.8   | 1.9   | 1.9   |
| Goats' milk  | 17.9  | 24.0  | 24.0  |
| Hen eggs     | 2.3   | 2.3   | 2.3   |

**2006:** Figures assumed to be unchanged from 2005 (FAO estimates).

Source: FAO.

## Forestry

### ROUNDWOOD REMOVALS

('000 cubic metres, excluding bark, FAO estimates)

|  | 2004         | 2005         | 2006         |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Sawlogs, veneer logs and logs for sleepers | 245          | 245          | 245          |
| Other industrial wood                      | 250          | 250          | 250          |
| Fuel wood                                  | 5,000        | 5,000        | 9,416        |
| <b>Total</b>                               | <b>5,495</b> | <b>5,495</b> | <b>9,911</b> |

Source: FAO.

### SAWNWOOD PRODUCTION

('000 cubic metres, including railway sleepers)

|                           | 1997      | 1998      | 1999      |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Coniferous (softwood)     | 20        | 21        | 22        |
| Non-coniferous (hardwood) | 54        | 55        | 57        |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>74</b> | <b>76</b> | <b>79</b> |

**2000–06:** Figures assumed to be unchanged from 1999 (FAO estimates).

Source: FAO.

## Fishing

(metric tons, live weight)

|                    | 2004         | 2005*        | 2006*        |
|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Capture            | 7,826        | 7,800        | 7,800        |
| Nile tilapia       | 3,120        | 3,100        | 3,100        |
| Aquaculture        | 386          | 386          | 400          |
| Nile tilapia       | 340          | 340          | 340          |
| <b>Total catch</b> | <b>8,212</b> | <b>8,186</b> | <b>8,200</b> |

\*FAO estimates.

Source: FAO.

## Mining

(metric tons, unless otherwise indicated)

|                                     | 2004 | 2005 | 2006* |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|-------|
| Tin concentrates†*                  | 550  | 700  | 700   |
| Tungsten concentrates†              | 113  | 401  | 400   |
| Columbo-tantalite‡                  | 220  | 276  | 280   |
| Natural gas (million cubic metres)§ | 140  | 170  | 170   |

\* Estimates.

† Figures refer to the metal content of ores and concentrates.

‡ Figures refer to the estimated production of mineral concentrates. The metal content (estimates, metric tons) was: Niobium (Columbium) 69 in 2004, 86 in 2005, 88 in 2006; Tantalum 49 in 2004, 61 in 2005, 62 in 2006.

§ Figures refer to gross output.

Source: US Geological Survey.

## Industry

## SELECTED PRODUCTS

|                                | 2001   | 2002    | 2003    |
|--------------------------------|--------|---------|---------|
| Beer ('000 hectolitres)        | 479    | 539     | 412     |
| Soft drinks ('000 hectolitres) | 228    | n.a.    | n.a.    |
| Cigarettes (million)           | 278    | 391     | 402     |
| Soap (metric tons)             | 7,056  | 5,571   | 4,456   |
| Cement (metric tons)           | 83,024 | 100,568 | 105,105 |
| Electric energy (million kWh)  | 89.3   | n.a.    | n.a.    |

Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Statistical Annex* (August 2002) and IMF, *Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix* (December 2004).**Cement** ('000 metric tons): 104.3 in 2004; 101.1 in 2005; 100.0 in 2006 (estimate) (Source: US Geological Survey).

## Finance

## CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE RATES

## Monetary Units

100 centimes = 1 franc rwandais (Rwanda franc).

## Sterling, Dollar and Euro Equivalents (31 March 2008)

£1 sterling = 1,0891.94 Rwanda francs;

US \$1 = 544.10 Rwanda francs;

€1 = 860.33 Rwanda francs;

10,000 Rwanda francs = £9.24 = \$18.38 = €11.62.

## Average Exchange Rate (Rwanda francs per US \$)

|      |         |
|------|---------|
| 2005 | 557.823 |
| 2006 | 551.712 |
| 2007 | 546.960 |

Note: Since September 1983 the currency has been linked to the IMF special drawing right (SDR). Until November 1990 the mid-point exchange rate was SDR 1 = 102.71 Rwanda francs. In November 1990 a new rate of SDR 1 = 171.18 Rwanda francs was established. This remained in effect until June 1992, when the rate was adjusted to SDR 1 = 201.39 Rwanda francs. The latter parity was maintained until February 1994, since when the rate has been frequently adjusted. In March 1995 the Government introduced a market-determined exchange rate system.

BUDGET  
(‘000 million Rwanda francs)

| Revenue*                             | 1999        | 2000        | 2001†       |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Tax revenue                          | 60.4        | 65.3        | 79.5        |
| Taxes on income and profits          | 15.2        | 17.9        | 23.9        |
| Company profits tax                  | 7.4         | 10.0        | 14.4        |
| Individual income tax                | 6.1         | 7.5         | 9.0         |
| Domestic taxes on goods and services | 33.6        | 35.2        | 41.0        |
| Excise taxes                         | 17.9        | 18.8        | 14.2        |
| Turnover tax                         | 12.9        | 13.8        | 24.2        |
| Road fund                            | 2.7         | 2.5         | 2.6         |
| Taxes on international trade         | 11.0        | 11.6        | 14.0        |
| Import taxes                         | 8.4         | 9.3         | 11.1        |
| Non-tax revenue                      | 3.2         | 3.3         | 6.7         |
| <b>Total</b>                         | <b>63.6</b> | <b>68.7</b> | <b>86.2</b> |

| Expenditure‡                    | 1999         | 2000         | 2001†        |
|---------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Current expenditure             | 86.0         | 89.2         | 107.4        |
| General public services         | 31.5         | 35.7         | 53.7         |
| Defence                         | 27.0         | 25.8         | 28.6         |
| Social services                 | 21.9         | 30.5         | 36.2         |
| Education                       | 17.2         | 24.0         | 29.8         |
| Health                          | 3.3          | 3.8          | 5.1          |
| Economic services               | 2.6          | 2.1          | 4.9          |
| Energy and public works         | 0.7          | 0.4          | 2.3          |
| Interest on public debt         | 4.0          | 1.8          | 2.8          |
| Adjustment                      | -1.1         | -6.7         | -18.8        |
| Capital expenditure             | 40.8         | 42.0         | 50.0         |
| <b>Sub-total</b>                | <b>126.8</b> | <b>131.2</b> | <b>157.5</b> |
| Adjustment for payment arrears§ | 2.0          | -1.2         | 31.7         |
| <b>Total</b>                    | <b>128.8</b> | <b>130.0</b> | <b>189.2</b> |

\* Excluding grants received ('000 million Rwanda francs): 38.5 in 1999; 63.7 in 2000; 63.3† in 2001.

† Estimates.

‡ Excluding lending minus repayments ('000 million Rwanda francs): -0.4 in 1999; 0.5 in 2000; 0.6 in 2001†.

§ Minus sign indicates increase in arrears.

Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Statistical Annex* (August 2002).

**2002** (estimates, '000 million Rwanda francs): *Revenue*: Tax revenue 94.6; Non-tax revenue 6.6; Total 101.2, excl. grants received (70.8). *Expenditure*: Current 123.7; Capital 56.4; Total 180.1, excl. net lending (11.5) (Source: IMF, *Rwanda: First Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Rwanda—June 2003*).

**2005** ('000 million Rwanda francs): *Revenue*: Tax revenue 162.6; Non-tax revenue 17.7; Total 180.3, excl. grants received (169.1). *Expenditure*: Current 214.9; Capital 121.4; Total 336.3, excl. net lending (4.4) (Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Third Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion—Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Rwanda—March 2008*).

**2006** ('000 million Rwanda francs): *Revenue*: Tax revenue 193.6; Non-tax revenue 14.6; Total 208.2, excl. grants received (167.8). *Expenditure*: Current 254.1; Capital 118.7; Total 372.9, excl. net lending (9.6) (Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Third Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion—Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Rwanda—March 2008*).

## INTERNATIONAL BANK RESERVES

(US \$ million at 31 December)

|                            | 2005          | 2006          | 2007          |
|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| IMF special drawing rights | 25.91         | 22.85         | 24.06         |
| Foreign exchange           | 379.85        | 416.82        | 528.73        |
| <b>Total</b>               | <b>405.76</b> | <b>439.67</b> | <b>552.79</b> |

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

**MONEY SUPPLY**

(million Rwanda francs at 31 December)

|   | 2003          | 2004          | 2005           |
|---|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| Currency outside banks . . . . .                    | 29,246        | 36,512        | 46,277         |
| Demand deposits at deposit money<br>banks . . . . . | 52,220        | 62,604        | 82,524         |
| <b>Total money</b> (incl. others) . . . . .         | <b>82,305</b> | <b>99,941</b> | <b>129,326</b> |

2006: Currency outside banks 52,620.

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.**COST OF LIVING**

(Consumer Price Index for Kigali; base: 2000 = 100)

|                            | 2005         | 2006         | 2007         |
|----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <b>All items</b> . . . . . | <b>138.1</b> | <b>150.3</b> | <b>164.0</b> |

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.**NATIONAL ACCOUNTS**

('000 million Rwanda francs at current prices)

**Expenditure on the Gross Domestic Product**

|   | 2004           | 2005           | 2006           |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Government final consumption<br>expenditure . . . . . | 206.4          | 238.6          | 294.1          |
| Private final consumption<br>expenditure . . . . .    | 945.9          | 1,109.6        | 1,357.9        |
| Increase in stocks . . . . .                          |                |                |                |
| Gross fixed capital formation . . . . .               | 171.0          | 209.1          | 250.7          |
| <b>Total domestic expenditure</b> . . . . .           | <b>1,323.3</b> | <b>1,557.3</b> | <b>1,902.7</b> |
| Exports of goods and services . . . . .               | 115.3          | 136.3          | 166.2          |
| Less Imports of goods and<br>services . . . . .       | 300.7          | 362.0          | 437.4          |
| <b>GDP in purchasers' values</b> . . . . .            | <b>1,137.9</b> | <b>1,331.6</b> | <b>1,631.6</b> |
| <b>GDP at constant 1995 prices</b> . . . . .          | <b>667.0</b>   | <b>n.a.</b>    | <b>n.a.</b>    |

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.**Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity**

|   | 2001         | 2002         | 2003         |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Agriculture, hunting, forestry and<br>fishing . . . . . | 305.2        | 341.6        | 373.9        |
| Mining and quarrying . . . . .                          | 14.5         | 9.1          | 5.7          |
| Manufacturing . . . . .                                 | 73.9         | 80.5         | 80.3         |
| Electricity, gas and water . . . . .                    | 3.4          | 3.4          | 3.6          |
| Construction . . . . .                                  | 71.2         | 82.9         | 103.1        |
| Trade, restaurants and hotels . . . . .                 | 75.2         | 82.0         | 91.7         |
| Transport, storage and<br>communications . . . . .      | 55.1         | 60.7         | 61.7         |
| Public administration . . . . .                         | 54.2         | 55.8         | 64.8         |
| Other services . . . . .                                | 101.6        | 109.0        | 120.4        |
| <b>GDP at market prices</b> . . . . .                   | <b>754.3</b> | <b>825.0</b> | <b>905.3</b> |

Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix* (December 2004).**BALANCE OF PAYMENTS**

(US \$ million)

|  | 2004        | 2005        | 2006        |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Exports of goods f.o.b. . . . .                            | 98          | 128         | 145         |
| Imports of goods f.o.b. . . . .                            | -276        | -355        | -488        |
| <b>Trade balance</b> . . . . .                             | <b>-178</b> | <b>-227</b> | <b>-343</b> |
| Exports of services . . . . .                              | 103         | 129         | 131         |
| Imports of services . . . . .                              | -240        | -304        | -243        |
| <b>Balance on goods and services</b> . . . . .             | <b>-315</b> | <b>-402</b> | <b>-455</b> |
| Other income received . . . . .                            | 6           | 27          | 27          |
| Other income paid . . . . .                                | -39         | -44         | -48         |
| <b>Balance on goods, services and<br/>income</b> . . . . . | <b>-349</b> | <b>-418</b> | <b>-476</b> |
| Current transfers received . . . . .                       | 169         | 352         | 319         |
| Current transfers paid . . . . .                           | -18         | -18         | -23         |
| <b>Current balance</b> . . . . .                           | <b>-198</b> | <b>-84</b>  | <b>-180</b> |
| Capital account (net) . . . . .                            | 61          | 93          | 1,323       |
| Direct investment abroad . . . . .                         | —           | —           | 14          |
| Direct investment from abroad . . . . .                    | 8           | 8           | 11          |
| Other investment assets . . . . .                          | 8           | -14         | -30         |
| Other investment liabilities . . . . .                     | -37         | -52         | -1,199      |
| Net errors and omissions . . . . .                         | 23          | 26          | 87          |
| <b>Overall balance</b> . . . . .                           | <b>-168</b> | <b>-23</b>  | <b>26</b>   |

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

2007 (US \$ million, estimated figures): Exports of goods 176.8; Imports of goods -581.2; Trade balance -404.4; Services (net) -207.6; Income (net) -17.2; Current transfers (net) 461.3; Current balance -167.9; Capital account 92.3; Financial account 183.4; Overall balance 107.9. (Source: IMF, *Rwanda: Fourth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion and Modification of Performance Criteria—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Rwanda—July 2008*).

**External Trade****PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES**

(US \$ million)

| Imports c.i.f.   | 2001        | 2002        | 2003        |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <b>Food and live animals</b> . . . . .                               | <b>46.5</b> | <b>31.7</b> | <b>24.5</b> |
| Cereals and cereal preparations . . . . .                            | 24.0        | 13.5        | 10.6        |
| Rice . . . . .   | 12.2        | 4.1         | 3.2         |
| Vegetables and fruit . . . . .                                       | 5.9         | 6.2         | 4.2         |
| Sugar, sugar preparations and<br>honey . . . . .                     | 8.6         | 5.9         | 5.0         |
| <b>Crude materials, inedible,<br/>except fuels</b> . . . . .         | <b>12.5</b> | <b>12.8</b> | <b>15.2</b> |
| Textile fibres and their wastes . . . . .                            | 7.7         | 8.3         | 10.3        |
| <b>Mineral fuels, lubricants and<br/>related materials</b> . . . . . | <b>39.7</b> | <b>40.7</b> | <b>40.6</b> |
| Petroleum, petroleum products and<br>related materials . . . . .     | 39.5        | 40.6        | 40.5        |
| Motor spirit, incl. aviation spirit . . . . .                        | 17.0        | 16.5        | 15.5        |
| Gas oils . . . . .   | 9.7         | 9.6         | 10.1        |
| Animal and vegetable oils, fats and<br>waxes . . . . .               | 8.7         | 6.7         | 4.3         |

| Imports c.i.f.— <i>continued</i>                              | 2001  | 2002  | 2003  |
|---|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Chemicals and related products</b>                         | 23.8  | 33.8  | 30.4  |
| Medicinal and pharmaceutical products                         | 8.5   | 13.7  | 12.8  |
| <b>Basic manufactures</b>                                     | 36.3  | 37.3  | 43.8  |
| Iron and steel  | 11.3  | 8.9   | 12.9  |
| <b>Machinery and transport equipment</b>                      | 60.0  | 63.2  | 75.0  |
| Telecommunications, sound recording and reproducing equipment | 19.2  | 7.2   | 10.9  |
| Electric machinery, apparatus and appliances, and parts       | 8.3   | 8.6   | 10.2  |
| Road vehicles   | 18.4  | 24.8  | 31.2  |
| <b>Miscellaneous manufactured articles</b>                    | 46.2  | 22.4  | 25.7  |
| <b>Total (incl. others)</b>                                   | 276.1 | 251.2 | 261.2 |

| Exports f.o.b.   | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|--|------|------|------|
| <b>Food and live animals</b>                           | 31.6 | 25.9 | 26.2 |
| Coffee   | 15.0 | 14.0 | 13.9 |
| Tea  | 16.6 | 11.8 | 11.9 |
| <b>Crude materials, inedible, except fuels</b>         | 22.7 | 18.8 | 15.4 |
| Metalliferous ores and metal scrap                     | 20.9 | 16.3 | 11.7 |
| Tin ores and concentrates                              | 2.2  | 1.4  | 5.1  |
| Ores and concentrates of other non-ferrous base metals | 18.7 | 14.9 | 6.0  |
| Ores of molybdenum, niobium and titanium               | 9.5  | 14.5 | 5.6  |
| <b>Total (incl. others)</b>                            | 55.5 | 46.0 | 50.4 |

Source: UN, *International Trade Statistics Yearbook*.

#### PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS (US \$ million)

| Imports                     | 2001  | 2002  | 2003  |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Belgium                     | 55.3  | 32.9  | 31.9  |
| Canada                      | 2.4   | 2.9   | 4.1   |
| China                       | 6.3   | 5.0   | 5.0   |
| Denmark                     | 1.9   | 5.8   | 2.8   |
| France (incl. Monaco)       | 6.1   | 6.4   | 7.4   |
| Germany                     | 6.6   | 7.2   | 11.2  |
| India                       | 6.4   | 6.8   | 9.0   |
| Israel                      | 4.8   | 2.9   | 2.0   |
| Italy                       | 7.5   | 3.1   | 3.0   |
| Japan                       | 7.2   | 6.4   | 8.4   |
| Kenya                       | 61.9  | 66.7  | 74.1  |
| Netherlands                 | 7.4   | 5.7   | 4.5   |
| Singapore                   | 1.6   | 0.8   | 0.6   |
| South Africa                | 12.5  | 11.0  | 12.9  |
| Switzerland-Liechtenstein   | 1.3   | 1.3   | 1.5   |
| Tanzania                    | 9.6   | 13.2  | 14.7  |
| Uganda                      | 8.1   | 11.1  | 20.0  |
| UAE                         | 19.5  | 22.0  | 19.9  |
| United Kingdom              | 8.0   | 6.5   | 4.3   |
| USA                         | 10.4  | 6.1   | 2.0   |
| Viet Nam                    | 4.8   | 0.9   | 0.2   |
| Zambia                      | 3.4   | 2.2   | 0.5   |
| <b>Total (incl. others)</b> | 276.1 | 251.2 | 261.2 |

| Exports                     | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|
| Belgium                     | 2.1  | 2.3  | 0.8  |
| Germany                     | 2.4  | 0.3  | 0.2  |
| Hong Kong                   | 1.3  | 4.6  | 0.3  |
| Kenya                       | 24.0 | 18.1 | 20.6 |
| Netherlands                 | 1.2  | 6.5  | 0.0  |
| Pakistan                    | 0.2  | 1.3  | 0.6  |
| Russia                      | 1.4  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| South Africa                | 6.2  | 0.3  | 0.5  |
| Switzerland-Liechtenstein   | 4.2  | 7.1  | 0.8  |
| Tanzania                    | 4.8  | 0.3  | 4.1  |
| Uganda                      | 2.5  | 1.0  | 13.4 |
| United Kingdom              | 0.3  | 0.8  | 3.1  |
| USA                         | 3.0  | 1.4  | 0.1  |
| <b>Total (incl. others)</b> | 55.5 | 46.0 | 50.4 |

Source: UN, *International Trade Statistics Yearbook*.

## Transport

### ROAD TRAFFIC

(estimates, motor vehicles in use at 31 December)

|                  | 1995   | 1996   |
|------------------|--------|--------|
| Passenger cars   | 12,000 | 13,000 |
| Lorries and vans | 16,000 | 17,100 |

Source: IRF, *World Road Statistics*.

### CIVIL AVIATION

(traffic on scheduled services)

|                           | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|
| Passengers carried ('000) | 9    | 9    | 9    |
| Passenger-km (million)    | 2    | 2    | 2    |

Source: UN, *Statistical Yearbook*.

## Tourism

(by country of residence)

|                             | 2000    | 2001*   |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|
| Africa                      | 93,058  | 99,928  |
| Burundi                     | 20,972  | 9,455   |
| Congo, Democratic Republic  | 10,450  | 28,514  |
| Kenya                       | 2,050   | 2,243   |
| Tanzania                    | 18,320  | 18,697  |
| Uganda                      | 38,897  | 38,472  |
| Americas                    | 2,250   | 2,785   |
| Europe                      | 6,412   | 8,395   |
| Belgium                     | 1,866   | 2,057   |
| <b>Total (incl. others)</b> | 104,216 | 113,185 |

\* January–November.

**Tourism receipts** (US \$ million, excl. passenger transport): 23 in 2000; 25 in 2001; 31 in 2002; 30 in 2003; 44 in 2004.

Source: World Tourism Organization.

## Communications Media

|   | 2004  | 2005  | 2006  |
|---|-------|-------|-------|
| Telephones ('000 main lines in use)           | 23.0  | 22.0  | 16.5  |
| Mobile cellular telephones ('000 subscribers) | 138.7 | 219.7 | 314.2 |
| Internet users ('000)                         | 38    | 50    | 65    |
| Broadband subscribers ('000)                  | 1.1   | 1.2   | 1.7   |

**Radio receivers** ('000 in use): 601 in 1997.

**Facsimile machines** (number in use): 900 in 1998.

**Daily newspapers:** 1 in 1998.

Sources: International Telecommunication Union; UN, *Statistical Yearbook*; UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook*.

## Education

(2004/05, unless otherwise indicated)

|                                    | Teachers | Students |           |           |
|------------------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
|                                    |          | Males    | Females   | Total     |
| Primary* . . . . .                 | 30,637   | 984,272  | 1,035,719 | 2,019,991 |
| Secondary:                         |          |          |           |           |
| general . . . . .                  | 7,764    | 68,695   | 62,444    | 131,139   |
| technical and vocational . . . . . |          |          |           |           |
| Tertiary . . . . .                 | 1,817    | 16,083   | 10,295    | 26,378    |

\*2005/06.

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

**Adult literacy rate** (UNESCO estimates): 64.9% (males 71.4%; females 59.8%) in 2000 (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics).

## Directory

### The Constitution

A new Constitution was approved at a national referendum on 26 May 2003 and entered into effect on 4 June. The main provisions are summarized below:

#### PREAMBLE

The state of Rwanda is an independent sovereign Republic. Fundamental principles are: the struggle against the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations; the eradication of all ethnic and regional divisions; the promotion of national unity; and the equal sharing of power. Human rights and personal liberties are protected. All forms of discrimination are prohibited and punishable by law. The state recognizes a multi-party political system. Political associations are established in accordance with legal requirements, and may operate freely, providing that they comply with democratic and constitutional principles, without harm to national unity, territorial integrity and state security. The formation of political associations on the basis of race, ethnicity, tribal or regional affiliation, sex, religion or any other grounds for discrimination is prohibited.

#### LEGISLATURE

Legislative power is vested in a bicameral Parliament, comprising a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. The Chamber of Deputies has 80 deputies, who are elected for a five-year term. In addition to 53 directly elected deputies, 27 seats are allocated, respectively, to two youth representatives, one disabilities representative, and 24 female representatives, who are indirectly elected. The Senate comprises 26 members, of whom 12 are elected by local government councils in the 12 provinces, and two by academic institutions, while the remaining 12 are nominated (eight by the President and four by a regulatory body, the Parties' Forum). Members of the Senate serve for eight years.

#### PRESIDENT

The President of the Republic is the Head of State, protector of the Constitution, and guarantor of national unity. He is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Presidential candidates are required to be of Rwandan nationality and aged a minimum of 35 years. The President is elected by universal suffrage for a seven-year term, and is restricted to two mandates. He signs into law presidential decrees in consultation with the Council of Ministers.

#### GOVERNMENT

The President nominates the Prime Minister, who heads the Council of Ministers. Ministers are proposed by the Prime Minister and appointed by the President.

#### JUDICIARY

The judiciary is independent and separate from the legislative and executive organs of government. The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court, the High Court of the Republic, and provincial, district and municipal Tribunals. In addition, there are specialized judicial organs, comprising *gacaca* and military courts. The *gacaca* courts try cases of genocide or other crimes against humanity committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. Military

courts (the Military Tribunal and the High Military Court) have jurisdiction in military cases. The President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General are elected by the Senate two months after its installation.

### The Government

#### HEAD OF STATE

**President:** Maj.-Gen. PAUL KAGAME (took office 22 April 2000; re-elected 25 August 2003).

#### COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

(July 2008)

**Prime Minister:** BERNARD MAKUZA.

**Minister of Defence:** Gen. MARCEL GATSINZI.

**Minister of Local Government, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs:** PROTAIS MUSONI.

**Minister of Internal Security:** MUSA FAZIL HERERIMANA.

**Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation:** ROSEMARY MUSEMINARI.

**Minister of Finance and Economic Planning:** JAMES MUSONI.

**Minister of Agriculture and Animal Resources:** CHRISTOPHER BAZIVAMO.

**Minister of Education:** Dr DAPHROSE GAHAKWA.

**Minister of Infrastructure:** LINDA BIHIRE.

**Minister of Trade and Industry:** MONIQUE NSANZABAGANWA.

**Minister of Natural Resources:** STANISLAS KAMANZI.

**Minister of Justice and Attorney-General:** THARCISSE KARUGARAMA.

**Minister of Public Service and Labour:** MUREKEZI ANASTSE.

**Minister of Health:** Dr JEAN-DAMASCÈNE NTAWUKURIRYAYO.

**Minister of Sports and Culture:** JOSEPH HABINEZA.

**Minister of Youth:** PROTAIS MITALI KABANDA.

**Minister in the Office of the President:** SOLINA NYIRAHABIMANA.

**Minister of Cabinet Affairs:** CHARLES MURIGANDE.

**Minister in the Office of the President, in charge of Science and Technology:** Prof. ROMAIN MURENZI.

**Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister, in charge of Family and Gender Promotion:** Dr JEANNED'ARC MUJAWAMARIYA.

**Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister, in charge of Information:** LOUISE MUSHIKIYABO.

**Minister of the East African Community:** MONIQUE MUKARULIZA.

**Minister of State at the Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs, in charge of Community Development and Social Affairs:** CHRISTINE NYATANYI.

**Minister of State at the Ministry of Education, in charge of Primary and Secondary Education:** THEONESTE MUTSINDASHYAKA.

**Minister of State at the Ministry of Natural Resources, in charge of the Environment, Water and Mines:** Prof. BIKORO MUNYANGANIZI.

**Minister of State at the Ministry of Infrastructure, in charge of Energy:** ALBERT BUTARE.

**Minister of State at the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources, in charge of Agriculture:** AGNES KALIBATA.

**Minister of State at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, in charge of Industry and Investment Promotion:** VINCENT KAR-EGA.

## MINISTRIES

**Office of the President:** BP 15, Kigali; tel. 59062000; fax 572431; e-mail info@presidency.gov.rw; internet www.presidency.gov.rw.

**Office of the Prime Minister:** Kigali; tel. 585444; fax 583714; e-mail primature@gov.rw; internet www.primature.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources:** BP 621, Kigali; tel. 585008; fax 585057; internet www.minagri.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Defence:** Kigali; tel. 577942; fax 576969; internet www.minadef.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Education:** BP 622, Kigali; tel. 583051; fax 582161; e-mail info@mineduc.gov.rw; internet www.mineduc.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning:** BP 158, Kigali; tel. 575756; fax 577581; e-mail mfin@rwanda1.com; internet www.minecofin.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation:** blvd de la Révolution, BP 179, Kigali; tel. 574522; fax 572904; internet www.minaffet.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Gender and the Promotion of Women:** Kigali; tel. 577626; fax 577543.

**Ministry of Health:** BP 84, Kigali; tel. 577458; fax 576853; e-mail info@moh.gov.rw; internet www.moh.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Infrastructure:** tel. 585503; fax 585755; e-mail webmaster@mininfra.gov.rw; internet www.mininfra.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Internal Security:** BP 446, Kigali; tel. 586708.

**Ministry of Justice:** BP 160, Kigali; tel. 586561; fax 586509; e-mail mjust@minijust.gov.rw; internet www.minijust.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Natural Resources:** Kigali; tel. 582628; fax 582629; internet www.minitere.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Rural Development and Social Affairs:** BP 790, Kigali; tel. 585406; fax 582228; e-mail webmaster@minaloc.gov.rw; internet www.minaloc.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Public Service and Labour:** BP 403, Kigali; tel. 585714; fax 583621; e-mail mifotra@mifotra.gov.rw; internet www.mifotra.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Trade and Industry:** BP 2378, Kigali; tel. 574725; fax 575465; internet www.minicom.gov.rw.

**Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture:** BP 1044, Kigali; tel. 583527; fax 583518; e-mail minicult@rwanda1.com; internet www.mijespoc.gov.rw.

## President and Legislature

### PRESIDENT

#### Presidential Election, 25 August 2003

| Candidate                            | Votes            | % of votes    |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Paul Kagame . . . . .                | 3,544,777        | 95.05         |
| Faustin Twagiramungu . . . . .       | 134,865          | 3.62          |
| Jean-Népomuscène Nayinzira . . . . . | 49,634           | 1.33          |
| <b>Total*</b> . . . . .              | <b>3,729,274</b> | <b>100.00</b> |

\* Excluding 49,634 invalid votes.

### CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

**Speaker:** ALFRED MUKEZAMFURA.

### General Election, 15 September 2008

| Party                            | Votes            | % of votes    | Seats      |
|----------------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------|
| Front patriotique rwandais*      | 3,655,956        | 78.76         | 42         |
| Parti social-démocrate . . . . . | 609,327          | 13.12         | 7          |
| Parti libéral . . . . .          | 348,186          | 7.5           | 4          |
| Independent . . . . .            | 27,848           | 0.6           | —          |
| <b>Total</b> . . . . .           | <b>4,641,317</b> | <b>100.00</b> | <b>80†</b> |

\* Contested the elections in alliance with the Parti démocrate chrétien, Parti démocratique islamique, Union démocratique du peuple rwandais, Parti de prospérité et de solidarité and Parti socialiste rwandais.

† In addition to the 53 directly elected deputies, 27 seats are allocated, respectively, to two youth representatives, one disabilities representative and 24 female representatives, who are indirectly elected.

### SENATE

**Speaker:** Dr VINCENT BIRUTA.

The Senate comprises 26 members, of whom 12 are elected by local government councils in the 12 provinces and two by academic institutions, while the remaining 12 are nominated (eight by the President and four by a regulatory body, the Parties' Forum).

## Election Commission

**Commission électorale nationale du Rwanda:** BP 6449, Kigali; tel. 597800; fax 597851; e-mail comelena@rwanda1.com; internet www.comelena.gov.rw; f. 2000; independent; Chair. Prof. CHRYSOLOGUE KARANGWA.

## Political Organizations

Under legislation adopted in June 2003, the formation of any political organization based on ethnic groups, religion or sex was prohibited.

**Front patriotique rwandais (FPR):** f. 1990; also known as Inkotanyi; comprises mainly Tutsi exiles, but claims multi-ethnic support; commenced armed invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in Oct. 1990; took control of Rwanda in July 1994; Chair. Maj.-Gen. PAUL KAGAME; Vice-Chair. CHRISTOPHE BAZIVAMO; Sec.-Gen. CHARLES MURIGANDE.

**Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC):** BP 2348, Kigali; tel. 576542; fax 572237; f. 1990; Leader ALFRED MUKEZAMFURA.

**Parti démocratique islamique (PDI):** Kigali; f. 1991; Leader ANDRÉ BUMAYA HABIB.

**Parti démocratique rwandais (Pader):** Kigali; f. 1992; Sec. JEAN NTAGUNGIRA.

**Parti libéral (PL):** BP 1304, Kigali; tel. 577916; fax 577838; f. 1991; restructured 2003; Chair. PROSPER HIGORO; Sec.-Gen. Dr ODETTE NYIRAMIRIMO.

**Parti du progrès et de la concorde (PPC):** f. 2003; incl. fmr mems of Mouvement démocratique républicain; Leader Dr CHRISTIAN MARARA.

**Parti progressiste de la jeunesse rwandaise (PPJR):** Kigali; f. 1991; Leader ANDRÉ HAKIZIMANA.

**Parti de prospérité et de solidarité (PSP):** Kigali.

**Parti républicain rwandais (Parerwa):** Kigali; f. 1992; Leader AUGUSTIN MUTAMBA.

**Parti social-démocrate (PSD):** Kigali; f. 1991 by a breakaway faction of fmr Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement; Leader Dr VINCENT BIRUTA.

**Parti socialiste rwandais (PSR):** BP 827, Kigali; tel. 576658; fax 83975; f. 1991; workers' rights; Leader Dr MEDARD RUTIJANWA.

**Rassemblement travailliste pour la démocratie (RTD):** BP 1894, Kigali; tel. 575622; fax 576574; f. 1991; Leader EMMANUEL NIZEYIMANA.

**Union démocratique du peuple rwandais (UDPR):** Kigali; f. 1992; Leader ADRIEN RANGIRA.

Other political organizations have been formed by exiled Rwandans and operate principally from abroad; these include:

**Rassemblement pour le retour des réfugiés et la démocratie au Rwanda (RDR):** Postbus 3124, 2280 GC, Rijswijk, Netherlands; tel. (31) 623075674; fax (31) 847450374; e-mail info@rdrrwanda.org; internet www.rdrwanda.org; f. 1995; prin. opposition party representing Hutu refugees in exile; Pres. VICTOIRE UMUHOZA INGABIRE.

**Union du peuple rwandais (UPR):** Brussels, Belgium; f. 1990; Hutu-led; Pres. SILAS MAJYAMBÈRE; Sec.-Gen. EMMANUEL TWAGILIMANA.

## Diplomatic Representation

### EMBASSIES IN RWANDA

**Belgium:** rue Nyarugenge, BP 81, Kigali; tel. 575551; fax 573995; e-mail kigali@diplobel.be; Ambassador FRANÇOIS ROUX.

**Burundi:** rue de Ntaruka, BP 714, Kigali; tel. 575010; Ambassador (vacant).

**Egypt:** BP 1069, Kigali; tel. 82686; fax 82686; e-mail egypt@rwanda1.com; Ambassador AHMED RAMI AWWAD EL HOSENI.

**Germany:** 8 rue de Bugarama, BP 355, Kigali; tel. 575141; fax 502087; internet www.kigali.diplo.de; Ambassador Dr CHRISTIAN CLAGES.

**Holy See:** 49 ave Paul VI, BP 261, Kigali (Apostolic Nunciature); tel. 575293; fax 575181; e-mail nuntrw@rwanda1.com; Apostolic Nuncio Most Rev. IVO SCAPOLO (Titular Archbishop of Tagaste).

**Kenya:** BP 1215, Kigali; tel. 583332; fax 510919; e-mail kigali@mfa.go.ke; Ambassador KETTER A. ALEX.

**Korea, Democratic People's Republic:** Kigali; Ambassador KIM PONG GI.

**Libya:** BP 1152, Kigali; tel. 576470; Secretary of the People's Bureau MOUSTAPHA MASAND EL-GHAILUSHI.

**Russia:** 19 ave de l'Armée, BP 40, Kigali; tel. 575286; fax 574818; e-mail ambruss@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; Ambassador MIRGAYAS M. SHIRINSKII.

**South Africa:** 1370 blvd de l'Umuganda, POB 6563, Kacyiru-Sud, Kigali; tel. 583185; fax 511760; e-mail saemkgl@rwanda1.com; internet www.saembassy-kigali.org.rw; Ambassador EZRA M. SIGWELA.

**United Kingdom:** Parcelle 1131, Blvd de l'Umuganda, Kacyiru, BP 576, Kigali; tel. 584098; fax 582044; e-mail embassy.kigali@fco.gov.uk; internet www.britishembassykigali.org.rw; Ambassador NICHOLAS CANNON.

**USA:** blvd de la Révolution, BP 28, Kigali; tel. 505601; fax 507143; e-mail irckigali@state.gov; internet kigali.usembassy.gov; Chargé d'affaires a.i. CHERYL SIM.

## Judicial System

The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court, the High Court of the Republic, and provincial, district and municipal Tribunals. In addition, there are specialized judicial organs, comprising *gacaca* and military courts. The *gacaca* courts were established to try cases of genocide or other crimes against humanity committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. Trials for categories of lesser genocide crimes were to be conducted by councils in the communities in which they were committed, with the aim of alleviating pressure on the existing judicial system. Trials under the *gacaca* court system formally commenced on 25 November 2002. Military courts (the Military Tribunal and the High Military Court) have jurisdiction in military cases. The President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General are elected by the Senate.

### Supreme Court

Kigali; tel. 87407.

The Supreme Court comprises five sections: the Department of Courts and Tribunals; the Court of Appeals; the Constitutional Court; the Council of State; and the Revenue Court.

**President of the Supreme Court:** ALOYSIA CYANZAIRE.

**Vice-President:** Prof. SAM RUGEGE.

**Prosecutor-General:** MARTIN NGOGAEU MUCYO.

## Religion

### AFRICAN RELIGIONS

About one-half of the population hold traditional beliefs.

### CHRISTIANITY

**Union des Eglises Rwandaises:** BP 79, Kigali; tel. 85825; fax 83554; f. 1963; formerly Conseil Protestant du Rwanda.

### The Roman Catholic Church

Rwanda comprises one archdiocese and eight dioceses. At 31 December 2006 the estimated number of adherents represented about 48.6% of the total population.

### Bishops' Conference

Conférence Episcopale du Rwanda, BP 357, Kigali; tel. 575439; fax 578080; e-mail cerwanda@rwanda1.com.

f. 1980; Pres. Rt Rev. ALEXIS HABIYAMBÈRE (Bishop of Nyundo).

**Archbishop of Kigali:** Most Rev. THADDÉE NTIHINYURWA, Archevêché, BP 715, Kigali; tel. 575769; fax 572274; e-mail kigarchi@yahoo.fr.

### The Anglican Communion

The Church of the Province of Rwanda, established in 1992, has nine dioceses.

**Archbishop of the Province and Bishop of Kigali:** Most Rev. EMMANUEL MUSABA KOLINI, BP 61, Kigali; tel. and fax 573213; e-mail sonja914@compuserve.com.

**Provincial Secretary:** Rt Rev. JOSIAS SENDEGEYA (Bishop of Kigali), BP 2487, Kigali; tel. and fax 514160; e-mail peer@rwandatell.rwanda1.

### Protestant Churches

**Eglise Baptiste:** Nyantanga, BP 59, Butare; Pres. Rev. DAVID BAZIGA; Gen. Sec. ELEAZAR ZIHERAMBÈRE.

There are about 250,000 other Protestants, including a substantial minority of Seventh-day Adventists.

### BAHÁ'Í FAITH

**National Spiritual Assembly:** BP 652, Kigali; tel. 572550.

### ISLAM

There is a small Islamic community.

## The Press

### REGULATORY AUTHORITY

**Haut Conseil de la Presse (HCP):** POB 6929, Kigali; tel. 570333; e-mail hcp@terramail.rw; internet www.hcp.gov.rw; f. 2002; Pres. DOMINIQUE KAREKEZI PADIRI; Exec. Sec. PATRICE MULAMA.

### PERIODICALS

**Bulletin Agricole du Rwanda:** OCIR—Café, BP 104, Kigali-Gikondo; f. 1968; quarterly; French; Pres. of Editorial Bd Dr AUGUSTIN NZINDUKIYIMANA; circ. 800.

**L'Ere de Liberté:** BP 1755, Kigali; fortnightly.

**Etudes Rwandaises:** Université Nationale du Rwanda, Rectorat, BP 56, Butare; tel. 30302; f. 1977; quarterly; pure and applied science, literature, human sciences; French; Pres. of Editorial Bd CHARLES NTAKIRUTINKA; circ. 1,000.

**Hobe:** BP 761, Kigali; f. 1955; monthly; children's interest; circ. 95,000.

**Inkingi:** BP 969, Kigali; tel. 577626; fax 577543; monthly.

**Inkoramutima:** Union des Eglises Rwandaises, BP 79, Kigali; tel. 85825; fax 83554; quarterly; religious; circ. 5,000.

**Kinyamateka:** 5 blvd de l'OUA, BP 761, Kigali; tel. 576164; f. 1933; fortnightly; economics; circ. 11,000.

**La Lettre du Cladho:** BP 3060, Kigali; tel. 574292; monthly.

**The New Times:** BP 635, Kigali; tel. 573409; fax 574166; monthly.

**Nouvelles du Rwanda:** Université Nationale du Rwanda, BP 117, Butare; every 2 months.

**Nyabarongo—Le Canard Déchaîné:** BP 1585, Kigali; tel. 576674; monthly.

**Le Partisan:** BP 1805, Kigali; tel. 573923; fortnightly.

**La Patrie—Urwatubyaye:** BP 3125, Kigali; tel. 572552; monthly.

**La Relève:** Office Rwandais d'Information, BP 83, Kigali; tel. 575665; f. 1976; monthly; politics, economics, culture; French; Dir CHRISTOPHE MFIZI; circ. 1,700.

**Revue Dialogue:** BP 572, Kigali; tel. 574178; f. 1967; bi-monthly; Christian issues; Belgian-owned; circ. 2,500.

**Revue Médicale Rwandaise:** Ministry of Health, BP 84, Kigali; tel. 576681; f. 1968; quarterly; French.

**Revue Pédagogique:** Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Research, BP 622, Kigali; tel. 85697; quarterly; French.

**Rwanda Herald:** Kigali; f. Oct. 2000; owned by Rwanda Independent Media Group.

**Rwanda Libération:** BP 398, Kigali; tel. 577710; monthly; Dir and Editor-in-Chief ANTOINE KAPITENI.

**Rwanda Renaitre:** BP 426, Butare; fortnightly.

**Rwanda Rushya:** BP 83, Kigali; tel. 572276; fortnightly.

**Le Tribun du Peuple:** BP 1960, Kigali; tel. 82035; bi-monthly; Owner JEAN-PIERRE MUGABE.

**Ukuli Gacaca:** BP 3170, Kigali; tel. 585239; monthly; Dir CHARLES GAKUMBA.

**Umucunguzi:** Gisenyi; f. 1998; organ of Palir; Kinyarwanda and French; Chief Editor EMILE NKUMBUYE.

**Umuhinzi-Mworozi:** OCIR—Thé, BP 1334, Kigali; tel. 514797; fax 514796; f. 1975; circ. 1,500.

**Umusemburo—Le Levain:** BP 117, Butare; monthly.

**Umuseso:** Kigali; independent Kinyarwanda language weekly newspaper; Editor CHARLES KABONERO.

**Urunana:** Grand Séminaire de Nyakibanda, BP 85, Butare; tel. 530793; e-mail wellamahoro@yahoo.fr; f. 1967; 3 a year; religious; Pres. WELLAS UWAMAHORO; Editor-in-Chief DAMIEN NIYOYIREMERA.

#### NEWS AGENCIES

**Agence Rwandaise d'information (ARP):** BP 453, Kigali; tel. 587215; fax 587216; internet www.ari-rna.co.rw; f. 1975.

**Office Rwandais d'Information (Orinfor):** BP 83, Kigali; tel. 575735; fax 576539; internet www.orinfor.gov.rw; f. 1973; Dir JOSEPH BIDERI.

## Publishers

**Editions Rwandaises:** Caritas Rwanda, BP 124, Kigali; tel. 575786; fax 574254; e-mail caritas1@rwanda1.com; Man. Dir Abbé CYRIAQUE MUNYANSANGA; Editorial Dir ALBERT NAMBAJE.

**Implico:** BP 721, Kigali; tel. 573771.

**Imprimerie de Kabgayi:** BP 66, Gitarama; tel. 562252; fax 562345; e-mail imprikabgayi@yahoo.fr; f. 1932; Dir Abbé CYRILLE UWIZEYE.

**Imprimerie de Kigali, SARL:** 1 blvd de l'Umuganda, BP 956, Kigali; tel. 582032; fax 584047; e-mail impkig@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; f. 1980; Dir LÉONCE NSENGIMANA.

**Imprimerie URWEGO:** BP 762, Kigali; tel. 86027; Dir JEAN NSEN-GIYUNVA.

**Pallotti-Press:** BP 863, Kigali; tel. 574084.

#### GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING HOUSES

**Imprimerie Nationale du Rwanda:** BP 351, Kigali; tel. 576214; fax 575820; f. 1967; Dir JUVÉNAL NDISANZE.

**Régie de l'Imprimerie Scolaire (IMPRISCO):** BP 1347, Kigali; tel. 85818; fax 85695; e-mail imprisco@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; f. 1985; Dir JEAN DE DIEU GAKWANDI.

## Broadcasting and Communications

#### TELECOMMUNICATIONS

**Rwandatel:** BP 1332, Kigali; tel. 576777; fax 573110; e-mail info@rwandatel.rw; internet www.rwandatel.rw; national telecommunications service; privatized mid-2005.

**MTN Rwandacell:** BP 264, MTN Centre, Nyarutarama, Kigali; tel. 586863; fax 586865; internet www.mtn.co.rw; f. 1998; provides mobile cellular telephone services; CEO THEMBA KHUMALO.

#### BROADCASTING

##### Radio

**Radio Rwanda:** BP 83, Kigali; tel. 575665; fax 576185; f. 1961; state-controlled; daily broadcasts in Kinyarwanda, Swahili, French and English; Dir of Programmes DAVID KABUYE.

**Deutsche Welle Relay Station Africa:** Kigali; daily broadcasts in German, English, French, Hausa, Swahili, Portuguese and Amharic.

##### Television

**Télévision rwandaise (TVR):** Kigali; fax 575024; f. 1992; transmissions reach more than 60% of national territory; broadcasts for 10 hours daily in Kinyarwanda, French and English.

## Finance

(cap. = capital; res = reserves; dep. = deposits; m. = million; brs = branches; amounts in Rwanda francs)

#### BANKING

##### Central Bank

**Banque Nationale du Rwanda:** ave Paul VI, BP 531, Kigali; tel. 575282; fax 572551; e-mail info@bnr.rw; internet www.bnr.rw; f. 1964; bank of issue; cap. 2,000m., res 15,600.6m., dep. 183,317.7m. (Dec. 2006); Gov. FRANÇOIS KANIMBA.

##### Commercial Banks

Following the privatization of two commercial banks, government control of the banking section was reduced from 45% in 2003 to 22% in 2005, although the three largest banks continued to control two-thirds of the system's assets, valued at US \$365m. (equivalent to 34% of GDP).

**Bancor SA:** 3rd Floor, UTC Bldg, 1232 ave de la Paix, BP 2059, Kigali; tel. 500091; fax 575761; e-mail bancor@rwanda1.com; internet www.bancor.co.rw; f. 1995 as Banque à la Confiance d'Or; name changed as above in 2001 when acquired by private investors; cap. and res 3,417.1m., total assets 34,549.3m. (Dec. 2005); Pres. NICHOLAS WATSON.

**Banque de Commerce, de Développement et d'Industrie (BCDI):** ave de la Paix, BP 3268, Kigali; tel. 574437; fax 573790; e-mail info@bcdi.co.rw; internet www.bcdi.co.rw; cap. and res 3,158.4m., total assets 45,950.9m. (Dec. 2003); Pres. and Dir-Gen. ALFRED KALISA.

**Banque Commerciale du Rwanda, SA:** BP 354, 11 blvd de la Révolution, Kigali; tel. 595200; fax 573395; e-mail bcr@rwanda1.com; internet www.bcr.co.rw; f. 1963; privatized Sept. 2004; cap. 3,478.8m., res 673,350.0m., dep. 42,040.3m. (Dec. 2005); Chair. Dr NKOSANA MOYO; Man. Dir DAVID KUWANA; 6 brs.

**Banque de Kigali, SA:** 63 ave du Commerce, BP 175, Kigali; tel. 576931; fax 573461; e-mail bkg10@rwanda1.com; f. 1966; cap. 1,500.0m., res 4,330.1m., dep. 59,378.6m. (Dec. 2005); Chair. FRANÇOIS NKURIKIYIMFURA; Gen. Man. THIBAUT DE MAISIÈRES; 6 brs.

**Caisse Hypothécaire du Rwanda (CHR):** BP 1034, Kigali; tel. 576382; fax 572799; internet www.chr.co.rw; 56% state-owned; cap. 778.2m., total assets 6,966.8m. (Dec. 2003); Pres. FRANÇOIS RUTISHASHA; Dir-Gen. PIPIEN HAKIZABERA.

**Compagnie Générale de Banque:** blvd de l'Umuganda, BP 5230, Kigali; tel. 503343; fax 503336; e-mail cogebank@rwanda1.com; cap. and res 1,210.8m., total assets 7,297.4m. (Dec. 2003); Pres. ANDRÉ KATABARWA.

**Fina Bank SA:** 20 blvd de la Révolution, BP 331, Kigali; tel. 598600; fax 573486; e-mail info@finabank.co.rw; internet www.finabank.co.rw; f. 1983 as Banque Continentale Africaine (Rwanda); name changed 2005; cap. 1,650m., res 1,028.7m., dep. 22,730m. (Dec. 2006); privatized; Chair. ROBERT BINYOU; Man. Dir STEPHEN CALEY; 5 brs.

##### Development Banks

**Banque Rwandaise de Développement, SA (BRD):** blvd de la Révolution, BP 1341, Kigali; tel. 575079; fax 573569; e-mail brd@brd.com.rw; internet www.brd.com.rw; f. 1967; 56% state-owned; cap. and res 4,104.6m., total assets 13,920.7m. (Dec. 2003); Man. Dir THEOGÈNE TURATSINZE.

**Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda (Banki z'Abaturage mu Rwanda):** BP 1348, Kigali; tel. 573559; fax 573579; e-mail ubpr@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; internet www.ubpr.co.rw; f. 1975; cap. and res 1,180.5m., total assets 20,433.8m. (Dec. 2002); Pres. INNOCENT KAYITARE; 145 brs.

#### INSURANCE

**Société Nationale d'Assurances du Rwanda (SONARWA):** BP 1035, Kigali; tel. 573350; fax 572052; e-mail sonarwa@rwandatel1.rwanda1.com; f. 1975; cap. 500m.; Pres. FRANÇOIS NGARAMBE; Dir-Gen. HOPE MURERA.

**Société Rwandaise d'Assurances, SA (SORAS):** BP 924, Kigali; tel. 573716; fax 573362; e-mail sorasinf@rwanda1.com; f. 1984; cap. 1,002m. (2007); Pres. CHARLES MHORANYI; Dir-Gen. MARC RUGENERA.

## Trade and Industry

#### GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

**National Tender Board:** ave de la Paix, POB 4276, Kigali; tel. 501403; fax 501402; e-mail ntb@rwanda1.com; internet www.ntb.gov.rw; f. 1998 to organize and manage general public procurement.

**Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency:** Kimihurura, ave du Lac Muhazi, POB 6239, Kigali; tel. 510248; fax 510249; e-mail info@rwandainvest.com; internet www.rwandainvest.com; f. 1998 as Rwanda Investment Promotion Agency; Dir-Gen. FRANCIS GATARE.

**Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA):** ave du Lac Muhazi, POB 3987, Kimihurura, Kigali; tel. 595520; fax 578488; e-mail rracg@rwanda1.com; internet www.rra.gov.rw; f. 1998 to maximize revenue collection; Commissioner-Gen. MARY BAINE.

#### DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS

**Coopérative de Promotion de l'Industrie Minière et Artisanale au Rwanda (COOPIMAR):** BP 1139, Kigali; tel. 82127; fax 572128; Dir DANY NZARAMBA.

**Institut de Recherches Scientifiques et Technologiques (IRST):** BP 227, Butare; tel. 530395; fax 530939; e-mail irst@irst.ac.rw; internet www.irst.ac.rw; Dir-Gen. Dr JEAN BAPTISTE NDUWAYEZU.

**Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda (ISAR):** BP 138, Butare; tel. 530642; fax 530644; for the devt of subsistence and export agriculture; Dir MUNYANGANZI BIKORO; 12 centres.

**Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda—Café (OCIR—Café):** BP 104, Kigali; tel. 575600; fax 573992; e-mail ocircafe@rwanda1.com; internet ocir.vrsrv.com; f. 1978; devt of coffee and other new agronomic industries; operates a coffee stabilization fund; Dir-Gen. EPHREM NIYONSABA.

**Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda—Thé (OCIR—Thé):** BP 1344, Kigali; tel. 514797; fax 514796; e-mail ocirth@rwanda1.com; internet www.ocir-the.co.rw; devt and marketing of tea; Dir CÉLESTIN KAYITARE.

**Office National pour le Développement de la Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers et des Produits Animaux (OPROVIA):** BP 953, Kigali; tel. 82946; fax 82945; privatization pending; Dir DISMAS SEZIBERA.

**Régie d'Exploitation et de Développement des Mines (REDEMI):** BP 2195, Kigali; tel. 573632; fax 573625; e-mail ruzredem@yahoo.fr; f. 1988 as Régie des Mines du Rwanda; privatized in 2000; state org. for mining tin, columbo-tantalite and wolfram; Man. Dir JEAN-RUZINDANA MUNANA.

**Société de Pyréthre au Rwanda (SOPYRWA):** BP 79, Ruhengeri; tel. and fax 546364; e-mail sopyrwa@rwanda1.com; f. 1978; cultivation and processing of pyrethrum; post-war activities resumed in Oct. 1994; current production estimated at 80% pre-war capacity; Dir SYLVAIN NZABAGAMBA.

#### INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS

**Association des Industriels du Rwanda:** BP 39, Kigali; tel. and fax 575430; Pres. YVES LAFAGE; Exec. Sec. MUGUNGA NDOBA.

**Rwanda Private Sector Federation (RPSF):** POB 319, Kigali; tel. 583541; fax 583574; e-mail info@rpsf.org.rw; internet www.rpsf.org.rw; f. 1999 to replace the Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Rwanda; promotes and represents the interests of the Rwandan business community; Dir JEAN BOSCO KABAGEMBE; Sec.-Gen. EMMANUEL HATEGA.

#### UTILITY

**Electrogaz:** POB 537, Kigali; tel. 572392; fax 573802; e-mail fgatanazi@electrogaz.co.rw; internet www.electrogaz.co.rw; state-owned water, electricity and gas supplier; Dir JOSEPH MUJENGA.

#### MAJOR COMPANIES

**BP-Fina Rwanda:** BP 144, Kigali; tel. 572428; fax 574998; wholesale trade in petroleum products; Man. Dir GEORGES BOSSERT.

**BRALIRWA:** BP 131, Kigali; tel. 8301532; fax 85693; e-mail bralirwa@heineken.com; internet www.bralirwa.com; f. 1959; mfrs and bottlers of beer in Nyamyumba and soft drinks in Kigali; Man. Dir DOROTHEA PLANTENGA.

**Cimenterie du Rwanda (CIMERWA):** Kigali; f. 1984; mfrs of cement; post-war activities resumed in Aug. 1994; 1995 production estimated at 60% of pre-war capacity.

**Kabuye Sugar Works SARL:** BP 373, Kigali; tel. 575468; fax 572865; f. 1969; privatized 1997; owned by the Madhvani Group, Uganda.

**Office de la Valorisation Industrielle de la Banane du Rwanda (OVIBAR):** BP 1002, Kigali; tel. 85857; f. 1978; mfrs of banana wine and juice; post-war activities resumed in Dec. 1994; 1995 production estimated at only 1% of pre-war capacity; activities suspended; Dir ALOYS MUTAGANDA.

**Rwigass Cigarettes Co:** BP 1286, Kigali; tel. 575535; fax 575516; production of cigarettes; Man. Dir R. ASSINAPOL.

**Savonnerie de Kicukiro (SAKIRWA):** BP 441, Kigali; tel. 572678; fax 575450; e-mail hram@rwandatell.rwanda1.com; soap and washing powders; Chair. H. RAMJI.

**Société Emballage—Rwanda:** BP 1009, Kigali; tel. 575705; export of fruit and fruit products; production of soya- and cereal-based foods since 1997.

**Société pour l'Hydraulique, l'Environnement et la Réhabilitation:** rue de l'Akagera, Parcelle 3925, Nyarugenge, BP 1526, Kigali; tel. and fax 578630; fax 578851; e-mail rwanda@sher.be; internet www.sher.be; f. 1985; rural devt; Chair. and Man. Dir PAUL GATIN; Rwandan Rep. MICHEL-HENRI BOURGE.

**Société Rwandaise pour la Production et la Commercialisation du Thé (SORWATHE), SARL:** Kigali; tel. 75461; f. 1978; tea.

**TABARWANDA:** BP 650, Kigali; tel. 85539; e-mail tbr@rwandatell.rwanda1.com; produces cigarettes; Dir PIE MUGABO.

**Tôlerie Industrielle du Rwanda (TOLIRWA):** BP 521, Kigali; tel. 572129; produces sheet metal; Dir-Gen. JAFFER.

#### TRADE UNIONS

**Centrale d'Éducation et de Coopération des Travailleurs pour le Développement/Alliance Coopérative au Rwanda (CECOTRAD/ACORWA):** BP 295, Kigali; f. 1984; Pres. ELIE KATBARWA.

**Centrale Syndicale des Travailleurs du Rwanda:** BP 1645, Kigali; tel. 85658; fax 84012; e-mail cestrav@rwandatell.rwanda1.com; Sec.-Gen. FRANÇOIS MURANGIRA.

## Transport

#### RAILWAYS

There are no railways in Rwanda, although plans exist for the eventual construction of a line passing through Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, to connect with the Kigoma—Dar es Salaam line in Tanzania. Rwanda has access by road to the Tanzanian railways system.

#### ROADS

In 2004 there were an estimated 14,008 km of roads, of which 2,662 km were paved. There are road links with Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Internal conflict during 1994 caused considerable damage to the road system and the destruction of several important bridges.

**Office National des Transports en Commun (ONATRACOM):** BP 619, Kigali; tel. 575411; fax 576126; e-mail onatraco@rwanda1.com; internet www.onatraco.rw; f. 1978; Dir-Gen. ESDRAS NKUNDUMUKIZA.

#### INLAND WATERWAYS

There are services on Lake Kivu between Cyanguu, Gisenyi and Kibuye, including two vessels operated by ONATRACOM.

#### CIVIL AVIATION

The Kanombe international airport at Kigali can process up to 500,000 passengers annually. There is a second international airport at Kameembe, near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are airfields at Butare, Gabiro, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, servicing internal flights.

**Alliance Express Rwanda (ALEX):** BP 1440, Kigali; tel. 82409; fax 82417; e-mail aev@aev.com.rw; f. 1998 to succeed fmr Air Rwanda as national carrier; 51% owned by Alliance Air (jty owned by Govts of Uganda and South Africa and by South African Airways), 49% state-owned; domestic and regional passenger and cargo services; Chair. GERALD ZIRIMWABAGABO.

**Rwandair Express:** Centenary House, 2nd Floor, ave de la Paix, BP 7275, Kigali; tel. 503687; fax 503686; e-mail info@rwandair.com; internet www.rwandair.com; f. 1998; privately owned; operates two passenger aircraft; regional services; CEO PIERRE CLAVER KABERA (acting).

## Tourism

Attractions for tourists include the wildlife of the national parks (notably mountain gorillas), Lake Kivu and fine mountain scenery. Since the end of the transitional period in late 2003, the Government has increased efforts to develop the tourism industry. In 1998 there were only an estimated 2,000 foreign visitors to Rwanda, but by 2001 the number of tourist arrivals had increased to 113,185. Total receipts from tourism were estimated at US \$44m. in 2004.

**Office Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux (ORTPN):** blvd de la Révolution 1, BP 905, Kigali; tel. 576514; fax 576515; e-mail [webmaster@rwandatourism.com](mailto:webmaster@rwandatourism.com); internet [www.rwandatourism.com](http://www.rwandatourism.com); f. 1973; govt agency.

## Defence

As assessed at November 2007, the total strength of the Rwandan armed forces was estimated at 33,000, comprising an army of 32,000 and an air force of 1,000. In addition, there were an estimated 2,000 local defence forces. Further restructuring of the army, which was expected to be reduced in size to number about 25,000, was planned.

**Defence Expenditure:** Estimated at 33,900m. Rwandan francs in 2007.

**General Chief of Staff:** Gen. JAMES KABAREEBE.

## Education

Primary education, beginning at seven years of age and lasting for six years, is officially compulsory. Secondary education, which is not

compulsory, begins at the age of 14 and lasts for a further six years, comprising two equal cycles of three years. In 2003, however, the Government announced plans to introduce a nine-year system of basic education, including three years of attendance at lower secondary schools. Schools are administered by the state and by Christian missions. In 2004/05 78.7% of children in the relevant age-group (males 76.2%, females 81.2%) were enrolled in primary schools, according to UNESCO estimates, while secondary enrolment was equivalent in to only 13.4% of children in the appropriate age-group (males 14.2%, females 12.7%). The Ministry of Education established 94 new secondary schools in 2003, and a further 58 in 2005. Rwanda has a university, with campuses at Butare and Ruhengeri, and several other institutions of higher education, but some students attend universities abroad, particularly in Belgium, France or Germany. In 2003 the number of students at the six public higher education institutions was 12,211, with a further 8,182 attending about seven private higher institutions. Estimated total expenditure by the central Government in 2003/04 represented 24.2% of total public expenditure.

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